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THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY: CHALLENGE AND
OPPORTUNITY
SEYMOUR ROTHSTEIN AND DAVID

M.

ROSENBLATr*

PREFACE

Events are moving rapidly in Europe, which may require significant changes in the intended European Economic Community
structure. The paper provides a basis for understanding from
whence we have come and we can go forth together to observe the
opportunities provided for the future. It is a challenge that all nations must face and meet.
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If our companies are asleep, it could be a disaster.... They should
immediately start studying the situation in Europe so that they can be
ready if the curtain falls.
Philip Kotler 1
2

In 1992, a twelve member European Community plans to remove internal trade barriers among the members. The countries

have signed a treaty3 establishing the European Economic Community ("EEC"). Some have doubts as to whether the EEC will become a reality in 1992, 4 while others feel the EEC's birth and
success is almost a certainty. 5 While this paper will not explore the
EEC's probability of success, it will explore what American business planners can do to increase their trading success within such

an EEC.
Industries are already being warned about the EEC "freezing
out" American business. There is concern that some European
countries, through their national standards bodies, are seeking to
6
convert their national standards into EEC-wide standards.
Whether or not the EEC is adopting standards to purposely "freeze
out" foreign business is a moot issue. The fact remains that American businesses whose products do not comply with EEC standards
will be barred from entering the EEC. The drafts of the proposed
standards for products and services are not readily available to U.S.

companies.7 The EEC has already passed or proposed legislation
1. Mr. Kotler is a S. C. Johnson & Sons Distinguished Professor of International Marketing at Northwestern University's Kellogg Graduate School of
Management. Chicago Tribune, Nov. 11, 1988, § 4, at 5, col. 4. A recent survey
of major U.S. companies found that 54% were unfamiliar with Europe's transition toward a single market and even fewer were doing anything about it. Sly,
US. Firms Face 1992 on Shaky Ground, Chicago Tribune, April 10, 1988, § 4, at
1, col. 2.
2. The twelve members of the EEC are France, West Germany, Italy,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Britain, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Netherlands, Denmark, and Ireland.
3. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T. S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179 - II) (official English translation), 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (unofficial English translation) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
See also B. RUDDEN & D. WYATT, BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS 19 (1986) (for a text
of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community as Amended by
Subsequent Treaties).
4. Chicago Tribune, Nov. 11, 1988, § 4, at 1, cols. 3-4.
5. Tully, Europe Gets Ready for 1992, FORTUNE, Feb. 1, 1988, at 81.
6. Will US. Afrs. Be Able to Crack Huge European Market in 1992?, The
Air Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration News, Sept. 4, 1989, at 1, col. 2 (explaining that EEC-wide standards could greatly hinder U.S. manufacturers'
ability to sell products in the EEC). In fact, at least some industry leaders believe that an EEC member state may be able to develop more stringent standards than the EEC has adopted and enforce these standards within their
boarders. Id. at cols. 2-3.
7. For example, proposed standards are often not available in time for U.S.
companies to review and comment on them. Id. at 2, col. 5. Affecting the air
conditioning, heating and refrigeration manufacturers was a new document on
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regarding appliances,8 automobiles, 9 cosmetics' 0 and commerce, x1
among other things. This broad range of legislative targets should
serve as the EEC's warning that 1992 will affect all industries. Businesses which choose to adopt a wait and see attitude towards the
EEC's formation may wind up significantly behind their
competitors.
The EEC has the potential to provide American business with
tremendous trading opportunities inherent in a very large' 2 and
highly advanced market. Since Europe could very well attempt to
unify its market in ways that would adversely affect American industries i3 many Administration Officials have expressed keen apprehensions. 14 In the course of tearing down its own internal
barriers, it has been suggested that the EEC might well erect high
protective walls to keep out external competitors. 15 It is useful,
methods of testing air filters which had a comment deadline of July 18, 1989,
but did not appear until May, 1989. Id. The earlier proposed drafts never appeared. Id. U.S. businesses would like to see independent testing agencies, such
as UL or ETL, have a voice in adopting standards for the EEC. Unless U.S.
businesses have a voice, or they keep up with current regulations and standards,
"it will be difficult to sell U.S. air conditioning and refrigeration products in the
EC." Id. at 1-2, col. 4-5.
8. See Directive 84/530, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L300) 95 (1984) (on the approximation of the laws of the member states relating to common provisions for
appliances using gaseous fuels, safety and control devices for these appliances
and methods of surveillance of them).
9. See Directive 88/77, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L369) 33 (1988) (on the approximation of the laws of the member states relating to the measures to be
taken against the emission of gaseous pollutants from diesel engines for use in
vehicles).
10. See Directive 85/490, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L295) 30 (1985) (on the approximation of laws of member states relating to methods of analysis necessary
for checking the composition of cosmetic products).
11. See Directive 86/653, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L382) 13 (1986) (on the coordination of the laws of the member states relating to self-employed commercial
agents).
12. Farnsworth, US. Explores Another '92 European Expansion, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 4, 1988, § Y, at 13, col. 3. The common market of 1992 will provide
an integrated market of 324 million people. Chicago Tribune, Nov. 11, 1988, § 4,
at 1, col. 4.
13. Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 13, col. 3.
14. Administration Officials that expressed concern include Commerce Secretary C. William Verity, Under Secretary of State John C. Whitehead, and
Under Secretary of the Treasury M. Peter McPherson. Id. at 13, col. 3. This
concern is valid because in 1987, the U.S. provided 66.4 billion dollars worth of
goods and services to the European Community, more than any other nation
which is not a party to the EEC Treaty. This amount is more than the total
amounts of the next three largest suppliers combined, namely Japan, the Soviet
Union and Brazil. Greenhouse, The Growing Fear of Fortress Europe, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 23, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 2. But see Sly, U.S. Firms Face 1992 on Shaky
Ground, Chicago Tribune, April 10, 1988, § 4, at 5, col. 2 (suggesting American
business should not fear "Fortress Europe," but rather the formidable challenge the European competitors will become in the global market).
15. See Greenhouse, The Growing Fearof FortressEurope, N.Y. Times, Oct.
23, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 2; Farnsworth, supra note 12, at 13, col. 3. See also Riemer,
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therefore, to evaluate how an internally free but externally protectionist policy of the EEC could adversely affect American business.
It has been said that if the EEC adopts such policies, the undue barriers will lead to tariff wars.1 6 Therefore, two important initial
questions must be addressed. First, what should American business
planners do now to lessen the effect of the possible EEC's high protective walls? Second, how can an American business enterprise
use such walls advantageously to limit access by other American
competitors to the market where such others have failed to foresee
and act upon these problems?
There are many areas of concern for American business with
respect to the EEC. This paper discusses four of the more significant areas that should be considered in the future planning of how
to conduct business in the EEC. They are: (1) the structure of the
EEC; (2) the antitrust laws of the EEC; (3) the industrial property
laws ,of the EEC; and (4) the methods of doing business in the EEC.
1.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE EEC

The European Economic Community Treaty was signed in
Rome on March 25, 1957 by six original member States. 1 7 The European Economic Community, or EEC, is just one of three commuHeard & Peterson, Laying the Foundationfor a Great Wall of Europe, Bus.
WK., Aug. 1, 1988, at 40 (stating "Europeans are likely to move further to protect their own companies and penalize outsiders" by making sure the "Europeans get the first shot at benefiting from the single market"); Tully, Europe Gets
Ready for 1992, FORTUNE, Feb. 1, 1988, at 82 (suggesting that a unified market
might bring about a more unified opposition to outsiders). But see Mosbacher
Targets East Bloc Trade, Chicago Tribune, August 17, 1989 § 3, at 3, col. 1 (Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher stating he is optimistic that the single
market planned for Europe in 1992 would not be a closed fortress but open to
foreign goods); Wilsher, 1992, The Times (London), Oct. 23, 1988, Magazine section, at 16, 20, col. 4 (suggesting that the European market will be more open
than it is today, with very low opposition to outsiders).
16. See Atlas, Common Market, U.S. Ready Talks on Trade Dispute, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 17, 1989, § 3, at 3, col. 5 (suggesting that the U.S. has levied
$100 million in trade sanctions against Europeans due to the Common Market's
ban on U.S. hormone treated meats, and that the Common Market has already
approved a counter retaliation that would impose $96.6 million in tariffs on imports of U.S. walnuts and dried fruit). See also Atwood, The European Economic Community's New Measures Against UnfairPractices in International
Trade: Implicationsfor United States Exporters, 19 INT'L L.J. 361, 369 (1985)
(explaining that certain EEC regulations which help the EEC wage political
and economic warfare cannot be avoided, even by the most cautious of U.S.
businesses).
17. D. OVERTON, COMMON MARKET DIGEST 8 (1983). The original six member States of the EEC are France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. Among the Treaty's original institutions were an Assembly, a
Council, a Commission, a Court of Justice and an Economic and Social Committee. Id. at 16.
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nities comprising the Common Market. 18 Originally, each
community had its own institutions created by its own treaty. 19 Today, the unification of the three communities is complete and there
is a single Court of Justice, Assembly, Council, Commission and
Economic and Social Committee. 20

1.1

The Court of Justice

The Court of Justice2 ' is the supreme court with respect to the
EEC's legal matters. 22 Generally, the cases before the Court of Justice fall into one of four catagories: (1) direct actions, (2) references
for a preliminary ruling, (3) applications for interim relief, and (4)
staff cases. 2 3 Although the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is not
exclusively defined by the EEC Treaty,24 decisions of the Court of
Justice are binding on Member States, Community institutions and
all individuals. Courts of member nations may also appeal to the
18. The Common Market is comprised of the European Coal and Steel
Community, or ECSC, the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community,
or EAEC. Id. at 1. The EEC, ECSC, and EAEC Treaties have all been amended
by The Single European Act (SEA). See Official Journalof the European Communities, No. L 169, 29 June, 1987. See also Treaties Establishingthe European
Communities, 523-602 (abridged ed. 1987) (for a discussion of the changes the
SEA made to the different treaties).
19. The ECSC Treaty of 1951 had as its institutions a High Authority, an
Assembly, a Council' and a Court. The EAEC Treaty of 1957 had as its institutions'an Assembly, a Council, a Commission, a Court of Justice and an Economic and Social Committee. Id at 16.
20. The Merger Treaty, (OJ L152/2 13.7.67) (Treaty 67/443/EEC), signed at
Brussels on April 8, 1965 and brought into force on July 1, 1967 is responsible
for the unification of the three communities. D. OVERTON, supra note 17, at 370.
21. There have been many books and articles written on the Court of Justice, its structure, its policies, its procedures and its controlling instruments.
See, e.g., H. RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (1986); K.P.E. LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE PRACTICE AND

(1984); L.N. BROWN & F.G. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (2d ed. 1983); J.A. USHER, EUROPEAN COURT PRACTICE (1983); M. STUART, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THE RULE OF LAW
(1977); D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES ch. 9 (2d ed. 1976); Stuart, Problems of the European Community
PROCEDURE

-

TransatlanticParallels,36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 183 (1987) (drawing similari-

ties and differences between the Court of Justice and the United States
Supreme Court); Gordon, The Court of Justiceof the European Community, 33
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 409 (1984).
22. All decisions of the Court of Justice are contained in the European
Court Reports (1954-ISSN 0378-7591).
23. Staff cases consist of direct actions brought by employees of Community
institutions against the employing authority. An application for interim relief
is an interlocutory proceeding and may be made in all direct actions. K.P.E.
LASOK, supra note 21, at 26.

24. See, e.g., Convention of Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, signed by the six original Member States on
September 27, 1968. A consolidated version of the Convention and the Protocol
on the Interpretation of the Convention, after accession to the EEC Treaty by
other current Member States, is published in O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 97) (1983).
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Court of Justice for rulings on how to interpret the EEC Treaty.2 5
Only official Community languages26 may be used to argue
before the Court of Justice. When the Court is hearing a reference
for a preliminary ruling, the language used is "the language of the
national court or tribunal which refers the matter to the Court." 27
In all other proceedings before the Court, the language of the case
is selected by the applicant, 28 with some exceptions. 29
1.1.1

Direct Actions

A direct action 30 is one that is originally commenced before the
Court of Justice. 3 1 The Court has limited powers and may only

32
hear disputes against Member States or Community Institutions.
The Court may hear actions between Member States, between the
Commission or Council and Member States, between private persons and the Commission, the Council or the Community and between the Board of Directors of the European Investment Bank
and Member States or the Commission."
Direct actions proceed in four phases: (a) the written procedure; (b) directions and inquiries; (c) the oral procedure; and, (d)

the judgment. 34

The written procedure contains the parties' argu-

25. D. OVERTON, supra note 17, at 49. See also M. STUART, supra note 21, at
38 (explaining there is a supremacy problem when a judge of a national court
gets an interpretation from the Court of Justice which is in conflict with the
national law).
26. The official languages are Danish, Dutch, English, French, German,
Greek and Italian. K.P.E. LASOK, supra note 21, at 26. Irish can also be used
before the court. Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 29(1).
27. Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 29(2). The Rules of Procedure do not appear to deal
with the situation where the language of the referring court or tribunal is not
one of the recognized languages of the Court of Justice. K.P.E. LASOK, supra
note 21, at 26.
28. Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 29(2).
29. See Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 29(2)(a). See also, FERAM SpA v. High Authority, [1960] ECR 165, 170 (stating the language of the case is the language of the
defendant unless the defendant is a Community institution). Thus, where the
defendant is a Member State, or a natural or legal person having the nationality
of a Member State, the Member State's language must be the language of the
case. The applicant can choose amongst languages where the Member State has
more than one official language.
30. There are a number of direct actions, including: (a) actions for annulment, J.A. USHER, supra note 21, at 11-27; (b) actions for failure to act, Id. at 2729; (c) enforcement procedures, Id.at 29-33; (d) actions for damages relating to
non-contractual liability, Id at 33-42; (e) arbitration, Id. at 42-3; (f) rulings and
opinions, Id at 43-44; (g) ancillary and special procedures, Id at 44; and (h) disciplinary powers, Id, at 44-45.
31. Id at 7.
32. D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 21, at 166.
33. 4 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, THE LAw OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY § 5-257 (1988),
34. K.P.E. LASOK, supra note 21, at 29-30.
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ments in writing.3 5 Among other information, the written procedure must contain the subject matter of the dispute, the grounds on
which the application is based, and the form of order sought by the
applicant. 36 Once served with the written procedure, the defendant
has a choice between lodging a defense or raising a preliminary
37
objection.
The directions and inquiries commence at the close of the
pleadings, or written procedure. 35 During this phase, the Court decides what further steps to take in the proceedings, such as a preparatory inquiry. 39 When the Court orders a preparatory inquiry,
the Court, and not the parties, determine how the facts are to be
investigated. 4° However, the parties are allowed to apply for certain facts to be proved by witnesses 41 and may also object to witnesses,42 but should be wary of asking the Court to order other
measures of inquiry. 43
35. Id
36. See Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 38 for a complete listing of what the written

procedure must contain.
37. K.P.E. LASOK, supra note 21, at 32. A defense challenges both the admissibility and the merits of the application whereas a preliminary objection,
raised pursuant to article 91 of the Rules of Procedure, challenges admissibility
alone. Id
A defense must be lodged within one month of service of the application.
Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 41(1). Although the Rules of Procedure fail to set forth a
time limit in which a preliminary objection must be filed, it must be filed within
one month. This is to safeguard against the scenario where the applicant moves
for a default judgment, pursuant to article 94 of the Rule of Procedure, and the
Court may not know if the admissibility of the application is being challenged.
K.P.E. LASOK, supra note 21, at 32. A preliminary objection must be made with
a separate document. Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 91(1). The applicant for the preliminary objection must allege that there is a total bar to proceeding with the action, such as the Court lacking jurisdiction. I& at 33.
38. Id at 30.
39. Id. Although the Court carries out factual inquiries, the Court may order a preparatory inquiry. See Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 44. The preparatory inquiry
is performed by an appointed Chamber. Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 46. The object of
the preparatory inquiry is to put the Court in a position to make a finding of
fact. K.P.E. LASOK, supra note 21, at 36. However, the preparatory inquiry itself does not usually result in a finding of fact. Id
The Court specifies to the Chamber what issue or issues of fact are to be
determined. Id, The Chamber may conduct the preparatory inquiry in one of
the following manners: (a) the personal appearance of the parties; (b) a request
for information and a production of documents; (c) oral testimony; (d) experts'
reports; or (e) an inspection of the thing or place in question. Eur. Ct. Just. R.
P. 45(2). See generally J.A. USHER, supra note 21, at 187-216; K.P.E. LASOK,
supra note 21, at 34-37 for a further discussion on preparatory inquiries.
40. J.A. USHER, supra note 21, at 190.
41. Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 47.
42. Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 50.
43. See Case 110/75 Mills v. European Investment Bank, [1976] E.C.R. 1613
(applicant's request that the bank should disclose a report on his superior gave
rise to a question of privilege and was denied because the Chamber concluded
that the report added nothing to what was already known from the evidence);
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The oral procedure consists of the presentation of the Report
for the hearing, the oral argument before the Court, and the delivery of an opinion by the Advocate-General. 44 Although this is the
general rule followed by the Court, there is a dichotomy between
article 18 of the EEC Statute of the Court and article 54 of the
Rules of Procedure which is determinative of when witnesses will
45
be heard.
The judgment, in addition to other information, 46 must contain
a summary of the facts, the grounds for the decision, and the operative part of the judgment, including the decision as to costs. There
is no requirement that a case proceed to judgment. 47 However, the
method the party uses or the parties use to prevent the case from
proceeding to judgment may affect the parties. 48 Although there is
no route of appeal from a judgment by the Court, there are two
49
ways to seek a review of a judgment.
1.1.2 References for a PreliminaryRuling
A reference for a preliminary ruling5° is an interlocutory step
Case 51/65 ILFO v. H.A. [1966] E.C.R. 87 (applicant's request of appointment of
an expert denied because no evidence had been offered to justify the measure).
44. J.A. USHER, supra note 21, at 218.
45. Article 18 of the EEC Statute of the Court expressly includes the hearing of witnesses and experts in its definition of oral procedure. In contrast, article 54 of the Rules of Procedure treat the oral procedure as a separate stage
which begins after the hearing of witnesses and experts, which takes place during the preparatory inquiry. In practice, the simpler the case, the more likely
the witnesses will be heard on the same day as that set for the hearing of the
oral argument. J.A. USHER, supra note 21, at 218. In complex cases, the separation between these two stages is more apparent. Id See generally K.P.E.
LASOK, supra note 21, at 37-43; J.A. USHER, supra note 21, at 217-41 for further
discussion of the oral procedure.
46. See Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 63 for a complete listing of what the judgment
must contain.
47. See, e.g., Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 77-78.
48. See J.A. USHER, supra note 21, at 262-65 (drawing a distinction between
settling a case and withdrawing a case).
49. First, the Rules of Procedure permit the Court to review its decision if
the decision prejudices the rights of a third party. Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 97. To
apply for the review, the third party must: (a) specify the judgment contested;
(b) state how that judgment is prejudicial to the rights of the third party; and
(c) indicate the reasons why the third party was unable to take part in the origi-

nal case. Id
Second, a party may seek to have a judgment revised if a new fact is discovered which is a decisive factor and which was unknown both to the Court and
the party applying for the revision at the time of the judgment. See Eur. Ct.
Just. R. P. 98-100. The application for revision must be made "within three
months of the date on which the applicant receives knowledge of the facts on
which the application is based." Id. at 98.
50. See K.P.E. LASOK, supra note 21, at 46-56; J.A. USHER, supra note 21, at
45-53 for a detailed analysis of references for preliminary rulings.
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in the proceedings before a national court or tribunal 51 designed to
obtain a ruling from the Court on a point of Community law which
has arisen in the course of litigation between parties. 52 This interlocutory step enables the Court to ensure uniform interpretation
and application of Community law while also permitting a national
court5 3 to seek and obtain authoritative guidance on Community
law before proceeding. 54 The Court only rules on questions of Community law and the national court or tribunal retains the power to
decide any other issue of law or fact relevant to the dispute between
the parties.m The referring body is not free, however, to ignore the
Court's ruling on Community law.5
The national court or tribunal may elect to send the Court as
much information as possible, such as its findings of fact and national law, 57 an explanation of why it was led to make the reference, and why it considers an answer by the Court to be necessary
to render a judgment. 58 If there is no element of Community law
which the referring court or tribunal could usefully apply to the
dispute before, it, the Court may decline to reply to the reference for
59
a preliminary ruling.
1.1.3

Application for Interim Relief

An application for interim relief must be made by separate document6 and must "state the subject matter of the dispute, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the factual and legal grounds
for establishing a primafacie case for the interim measures applied
51. It is essential to know what constitutes a court or tribunal. J.A. USHER,
supra note 21, at 45. The nature of a body's jurisdiction, whether civil, criminal
or administrative, is not dispositive of the question of whether the body is a
court or tribunal. Cf.Case 82/71 Pubblico Ministero v. SAIL [1972] E.C.R. 119 at
5. Rather, a body will be considered a court or tribunal if it "is called upon to
give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial nature... [and which it is] under a legal duty to try." Case 138/80 Borker [1980]
E.C.R. 1975 at 4.
52. J.A. USHER, supra note 21, at 45.
53. A reference for a preliminary ruling is available to national courts and
not to the parties appearing before the court or tribunal. Id
54. K.P.E. LASOK, supra note 21, at 46.
55. Id
56. See Case 29/68 Milch, Fett-und Eierkontor GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarbrucken (No. 2) [1969] E.C.R. 165 (the Court's interpretation binds the referring
body but the latter may decide the Court's ruling was not sufficiently enlightening and thus the latter may make a further reference to the Court).
57. See Case 244/78 Union Laitiere Normande v. French Day Farmers Ltd.
[1979] E.C.R. 2663 at
5-6 of the judgment.
58. See Case 244/80 Foglia v. Novello [1980] E.C.R. 745 at
17 of the
judgment.
59. E.g., Case 132/81 Rijksdienst voor Werknemerspensioenen v. Vlaeminck
[1982] E.C.R. 2953.
60. Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 83(3). Also, the application must comply with Rule
37 and Rule 38. Id. at 37-38.
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for."' 61 The application for interim relief has three basic parts. 62
First, the application has a description of the dispute and the applicant's arguments.6 3 Second, the application must display a need of
urgency and a danger of serious and irreparable harm.64 In order to
grant relief, the judge must be given reasonable cause to believe
that the conditions for obtaining relief have been fulfilled.6 Third,
the prayer for relief must be set out in precise terms and be clearly
justified by reference to the matters set out in the body of the application. 66 Applications not made in the proper form may be rejected
67
as inadmissible.
1.2

The Assembly

The European Parliament s exercises for the EEC the powers
conferred upon the "Assembly" established by articles 137-144 of
the EEC Treaty. 69 The members70 of Parliament are "representatives of the peoples of the States" 71 and do not represent the States
themselves. Thus, the representatives are not subject to instructions from their respective governments. 72 However, the members
of Parliament, in appropriate circumstances, defend the interests of
73
their particular country.
The Assembly, or European Parliament, functions in an advi61. Eur. Ct. Just. R. P. 83(2).
62. K.P.E. LASOK, supra note 21, at 172-73.
63. The purpose of this part is to show the context of the application for

relief and demonstrate the applicant has an arguable case. Id. at 172.
64. Mere assertions without evidence or reference to materials of probative
value to support the assertions do not demonstrate the danger of serious and
irreparable harm. See Case 53/65R Artino Mondina SpA v. High Authority
[1966] E.C.R. 17. But see Ferriere di Roe Volciano v. Commission [1983] E.C.R.
725 (preliminary assessment of one issue of fact made on the basis of statements
made at the hearing). In sum, the applicant must produce relevant documents
in his possession or control in addition to indicating other sources of evidence.
K.P.E. LASOK, supra note 21, at 172-73.
65. Case 18/57A Nold KG v. High Authority [1957-1958] E.C.R. 121, 127.
66. K.P.E. LASOK, supra note 21, at 173.
67. See Case 731/79R II B v. European Parliament [1980] E.C.R. 829.
68. The words "European Parliament" are used interchangeably with the
word "Assembly." See generally, 4 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 517 to 5-78; D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 21, at 133-45 for more detailed
discussion of the Assembly.
69. Article 138, which provided for the constituents of the Assembly, lapsed
on 17 July 1979 in accordance with the Council Decision and Act of 20 September 1976 on Direct Elections. B. RUDDEN & D. WYAT, BAsIc COMMUNITY LAWS

76 (2d ed. 1986).
70. In 1969, pursuant to Art. 175 of the EEC Treaty providing for actions
before the Court of Justice to seek remedies for illegal Community action, the
Parliament, through its President, sought to have direct election of its members. 1 G. MYLES, EEC BRIEF, ch. "Parliment," at 13.
71. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 137.
72. 4 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 5-23.
73. Id. at 5-24.
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sory and supervisory capacity and is not a legislative body. 74 In its
supervisory role, the Assembly possesses a power of censure over
the Commission.75 Also, in its supervisory role, the Assembly has
the power to ask questions. 76 Finally, when the Assembly discusses
the annual general report submitted to it by the Commission, 77 the
Assembly's supervisory functions are enhanced. 78 In its advisory
role, the Assembly has a right to be consulted on major policy pro79
posals in the EEC.
1.3

The Council

The Council s ° is an institution of the Community which is
madeup of one representative of the government of each of the
Member States.8 ' The Council's power and functions are derived
from articles 145-154 of the EEC Treaty, with some changes.8 2 The
Council members represent their respective Member States, unlike
other Community Institutions. 3 However, the Council must also
act in accordance with the provisions of the EEC Treaty,s 4 which
can sometimes present a conflict of interests problem for its
members.s 5
Article 145 of the EEC Treaty mandates that the Council coor87
dinate "the generals8 economic policies of the Member States"
74. D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 21, at 138.
75. See 4 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 5-68. Article 4 of the
EEC Treaty permits a "two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing a ma-

jority of the members of the Assembly," to force the entire Commission to resign and be replaced. I& The mere existence of the power of censure, even
without being introduced in the Assembly, can have important consequences.
I& at 5-69.
76. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 140. This allows the Assembly to keep
abreast with current Community developments. D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE,
supra note 21, at 139.
77. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 143.
78. D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 21, at 139.
79. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. 43, 54, 56, 87. The Council
may consult the Assembly after receiving a proposal from the Commission or
the Commission may consult the Assembly as it is drafting proposals. D. LASOK
& J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 21, at 139.
80. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. 145-154; 4 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG,
supra note 33, at 5-79 to 5-156; D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, supra note 21, at 118132 for a more detailed discussion of the Council of the EEC.
81. Merger Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 2; D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, supra
note 21, at 118.
82. Articles 146, 147, 151 and 154 were repealed and replaced by the Merger
Treaty, supra note 20. See B. RUDDEN & D. WYATr, supra note 69, at 78-81.
83. 4 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 5-82 to 5-82.1.
84. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 145.
85. 4 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 5-82.1, 5-94.
86. Although the word "general" is not in the German version of the
Treaty, its absence is of no significance. Id. at 5-95.
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and grants the Council the "power to take decisions. 88 To the extent the Council exercises its power to take decisions for the benefit
of the Community, the Council seems to be a supreme body. 9
Otherwise, however, the Council is not a supreme body9° and its
actions are not binding.91
1.4

The Commission

Articles 155 to 163 of the EEC Treaty were originally devoted
to the power and function of the Commission.92 However, this has
changed. 93 Commissioners are appointed by common accord of the

governments of the Member States for a four year renewable
term.9 The Commissioners cannot seek or take instructions from
any government or from any other body.95 There are a variety of
ways a Commissioner's term may end.9
Article 155 of the EEC Treaty imposes the general duty of ensuring the proper functioning and development of the common
market on the Commission.97 The Commission's duties can be classified as follows: (a) initiator and exponent of Community policies;
87. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. 103-109, 116 for more detailed
rules on the coordination of the general economic policies of the Member
States.
88. The term "decisions" is used in a broad sense. 4 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG,
supra note 33, at 5-94. While some authors maintain this power grants the
Council a position of supremacy over other Community Institutions, others disagree, partially due to article 162. Id. This article provides that "[t]he Council
and the Commission shall consult each other and shall settle by common accord
the methods of their cooperation." EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 162.
89. 4 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 5-94. See also Case No.
166/78 Gov't of the Italian Republic v. Council, [1979] E.C.R. 2575 (Member
State was not estopped from attacking a Council measure even though the
Member State's representative voted for it).
90. 4 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 5-95.
91. See generally EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 189, § 1.6 (explaining
that decisions are binding upon those to whom they are addressed but that recommendations and opinions have no binding force).
92. See Hallstein, European Economic Community Commission: A New
Factorin InternationalLife, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 727 (1965) (discussing the
Commission's function and role in the external relations of the Community in
addition to the control of the Commission, as given by former president of the
Commission, Dr. Walter Hallstein).
93. Articles 156-163 of the EEC Treaty were repealed by the Merger Treaty.
B. RUDDEN & D. WYA'rr, supra note 69, at 82. Articles 9-18 of the Merger
Treaty relate to the Commission. Id, at 82-84.
94. Merger Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 11. Only nationals of Member
States may serve as Commissioners. I& at art. 10.
95. Merger Treaty, supra note 20, at art. 10.
96. A Commissioner's term ends by normal expiration, voluntary retirement, death, through compulsory retirement, and through a motion of censure
on the whole Commission passed by the Assembly. Merger treaty, supra note
20, at arts. 12-13; EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 144.
97. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 155.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 24:145

(b) executive of the Community; and (c) guardian of the Treaties. 98
1.5

The Economic and Social Committee

The Economic and Social Committee ("Committee"), governed
by articles 193 to 198 of the EEC Treaty, is designed to give the most
important economic and social groupings an opportunity to participate in Community operations." Although the Committee must be
consulted by the Council or Commission in some instances x' b and
may be consulted on all matters of economic and social policy,' 01 its
opinions are advisory only.' 0 2 Therefore, in sum, the power of the
10 3
Committee depends on the quality of its opinions.
1.6

The Nature of European Economic Community Law

EEC law is comprised essentially of primary law and secondary
law. Primary law is comprised of the EEC Treaty along with agreements supplementing or amending the EEC Treaty, such as the Single European Act. Secondary law consists of binding legislative acts
98. 1 G. MYLES, supra note 70, ch. "Commission," at 3-18. The Commission
functions as initiator and exponent of the Community policy in that it formulates recommendations and delivers opinions on matters dealing with the EEC
Treaty. Id. at 3-19. However, the real significance of this part of the Treaty is
that it authorizes the Commission to act where such action is not authorized by
Community law. Id. Although the Council has the ultimate power to adopt or
reject the Commission's proposals, the Commission is still quite powerful. Id. at
3-20. This is because the Council adopts the proposal by a majority but may
only amend the proposal unanimously. Id Otherwise, the Council just fails to
come to a decision. Id
Also, although the Commission functions as executive of the Community,
Id. at 3-21, its executive functions are not similar to an executive branch of government in a country governed under the separation of powers principle. 4 H.
SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 5-163.
Finally, in functioning as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission acts as
a watchdog, ensuring due application of all Community laws by all parties. 1 G.
MYLES, supra note 70, ch. "Commission," at 3-24. In this context, the Commission's greatest power is that of obtaining information. Id. This is because
preventing people from breaking rules is easier than curing the problems
caused once the rules are broken. Id
99. 5 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 5-653.
100. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 198. Failure to consult the
Committee leaves the resulting decision open to attack before the Court of Justice, due to the violation of a substantial formal requirement. 5 H. SMIT & P.E.
HERZOG, supra note 33, at 5-670.1. See also EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 173.
Consequently, the Court of Justice may issue a declaratory judgment under article 174 that the decision or act is void. See Id at art. 174.
101.. 5 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 5-653. If the Council or
Commission considers it necessary to have the Committee's opinion, they must
afford the Committee at least 10 days to respond. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at
art. 198. If the Committee fails to respond, further action of the Council or
Commission is not barred. Id
102. 5 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 5-653.
103. 1 G. MYLES, supra note 70, ch. "Economic and Social Committee," at 4-
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taken by EEC institutions. 1° 4
Secondary law includes regulations, directives, and decisions.
Article 189 of the EEC Treaty provides that the Council and Commission shall make regulations, issue directives, and take decisions.
A regulation is directly applicable in all Member States and binding
in its entirety.'0 5 A directive is binding on the Member States to
which it is addressed as to the result to be achieved. 1°0 However, a
directive leaves the Member States to choose the method for
achieving the desired results. 10 7 Finally, a decision is binding in its
entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.' 08 The Commission
and Council also have the power to make recommendations and deliver opinions, but these have no binding force. 1' 9
2.

EEC ANTITRUST LAW
2.1 Background

All methods of doing business have potential antitrust liability.
Therefore, businesses should be familiar with the EEC antitrust
laws. Most Europeans feel the economic competition of the United
States would be ideal to emulate, and thus it is not surprising that
the EEC "has heavily borrowed from the American antitrust experience."' 10 However, the EEC faces many problems in implementing their dreams. Some Member States of the EEC, such as Italy,
have no current antitrust laws although most member States have
antitrust laws, such as Germany and France.' l Should national
laws and the EEC laws be applied concurrently? If so, alleged anticompetitive conduct would be tested under both EEC and national
laws. What happens if conduct is not prohibited by national laws
but is prohibited by the EEC laws? 112 Probably, the EEC laws will
prevail and the conduct will be deemed anti-competitive." 3 If the
conduct is permitted by the EEC but not permitted by national
4
laws, there can be larger problems."
104. See Appendix A for an illustrative chart detailing the process of EEC
legislation.
105. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 189.
106. Id.

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Jones, American Antitrust and EEC Competition Law in a Comparative Perspective, 90 L.Q.R. 191, 193 (1974). See also Dara, Antitrust Law in the
European Community and the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 47 LA.
L. REV. 761 (1987).
111. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-14 to 3-15.
112. See generally Jacobs, Civil Enforcement of EEC Antitrust Law, 82
MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1367 (1984).
113. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-23.
114. See Jacobs, supra note 112, at 1367.
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Articles 85 through 89 are the EEC's antitrust laws. Articles 85
and 86 are the substantive antitrust laws and Articles 87, 88 and 89
prescribe how the antitrust laws are to be executed. The antitrust
provisions apply to all aspects of the EEC's economic life with four
exceptions. 115 First, anti-competitive conduct of coal and steel industries is covered by Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty. The
EEC Treaty, in Article 232(1), gives deference to the ECSC Treaty
in these areas. Second, anti-competitive conduct in the atomic energy industry is governed by the Euratom Treaty, which is referred
to in Article 232(2) of the EEC Treaty. Third, Article 42 of the EEC
Treaty states that the Council can determine the extent to which
the antitrust provisions apply to agriculture. The Council has set
guidelines for this determination. 116 Finally, the Council has declared that the antitrust provisions of the EEC treaty do not apply
117
to transportation.
2.2 Substantive EEC Antitrust Law
The entire substantive EEC antitrust laws are contained in Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty.118 Also, many similarities can
be seen between the United States' Sherman Act and the antitrust
115. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-10 to 3-13.

116. See Regulation 26/62, J.0. Comm. Eur. 993 (1962), amended by Regulation 49/62, J.O. COMM. EuR. 1571 (1962).
117. Regulation 141/62, O.J. COMM. EuR. 2751 (1962).
118. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-10. EEC Treaty Article 85
provides as follows:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decision by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in
particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to the Article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in
the case of:
any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
_ any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which
contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to pro-
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provisions of the EEC Treaty. 119
2.2.1

EEC Treaty Article 85(1)

Article 85 is split into 3 sections. Article 85(1) is concerned
with consensual arrangements or concerted practices of economically independent forces. 120 Section 1 declares incompatible with
the common market and prohibited three kinds of practices: (1) all
agreements between undertakings, 12 1 (2) all decisions of associations of undertakings, and (3) all concerted practices of undertakings provided that they (1) are likely to affect commerce between
Member States and (2) have as their object or consequence prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the common
market.122 Thus, a violation of section 85(1) occurs if there is the
existence of an agreement or concerted practice between two or
more enterprises resulting in restriction of competition in the Com123
mon Market.
Acts which have a remote possibility of affecting commerce are
not "likely" to affect commerce. 124 However a heightened degree of
probability is not required. 125 Whether a specific agreement restricts competition and appreciably affects trade among Member
moting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensible to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition
in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
EEC Treaty Article 86 provides as follows:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject matter of
such contracts.
119. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 110, at 193; Dara, supra note 110, at 761.
120. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-96.
121. The EEC Treaty leaves the term "undertakings" undefined.
122. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-81.
123. Ward, The Economic Unity Doctrine in the EEC A Limited Exemption
to Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 373, 378 (1986).
124. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-107 to 3-108.
125. Id.

The John Marshall Law Review

[V7ol. 24:145

States is a question of fact, requiring an analysis of the entire eco1 26
nomic context in which the agreement operates.
Agreements, decisions, and concerted practices which "affect
commerce between Member States" both directly and indirectly
fall within the scope of section 1 prohibitions.1 27 This is evident
from the language used in Grundig & Consten v. Commission when
the Court of Justice stated "it is especially important to know
whether the agreement, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, is capable of jeopardizing the freedom of commerce between
Member States."1 28 Any confusion the Court may have created
with the words "especially important" was clarified in Societe Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH.i 29 The Court stated
that when determining whether an agreement, decision or concerted practice was within the purview of article 85 "it is necessary
to know whether it is capable of partitioning the market in certain
products between Member States and of thus rendering more difficult the economic interpenetration sought by the Treaty. 1 30 Thus,
both direct and indirect effects of commerce between Member
States are within the scope of article 85.
However, the international reach of the Common Market's legislative jurisdiction is a lingering and unsettled question. At least
one scholar points out that the preponderant view appears to be
that the Common Market may properly legislate to reach conduct
abroad that is designed to cause consequences within it.' 3i Thus,
for example, if two American companies divide the Common Market into two territories and agree not to sell in each other's territory, it will probably fall within article 85. Therefore, commerce
between Member States may be affected even when all enterprises
involved in the anti-competitive practice and the place where the
agreement is reached and/or executed are outside the Common
Market.
2.2.2 EEC Treaty Article 85(2)
Section 2 declares that agreements prohibited by Article 85 are
void. 132 Only the parts of the agreement that violate Article 85 are
126. Coleman & Schmitz, The EEC PatentLicensing Regulation- Practical
Guidelines, 42 Bus. L. 101, 102 (1986).
127. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-108.
128. Grundig & Consten v. Commission, Cases Nos. 56/64 and 58/64, July 13,
1966, 12 Rec. 429 (1966), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8046, 5 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 418 (1966) (emphasis added).
129. Case No. 56/65 June 30, 1966, 12 Rec. 337 (1966), Common Mkt Rep.
(CCH) 8047, 5 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 357 (1966).
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. See 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-115.
132. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 85(2).
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void. This is referred to as the "partial nullification doctrine.' 33
However, if the void parts cannot be separated from the agreement,
the entire agreement is declared void. This is referred to as the
"doctrine of transformation."' 1 4 Whether the void parts are separable is a question of EEC law, not national law. i 35 Courts consider
the decisive test to be whether the parties agreed, or would have
agreed, that the valid part of the agreement would survive the void
part of the agreement. i '3
2.2.3

EEC Treaty Article 85(3)

Section 3 is the built in "rule of reason" of Article 85. Even if
an agreement falls within the language of Section 1, the agreement
may still be valid if one proves the agreement also falls within the
language of Section 3. This is referred to as an "exemption."
The Commission can grant exemptions if the agreement (1)
contributes to the improvement of production or distribution of
goods or to the promotion of technical or economic progress, and (2)
leaves consumers a proper share of resulting benefits, without (3)
imposing restrictions on the parties which are not indispensible to
achieving these objectives, or (4) giving the parties the possibility of
eliminating competition in regard to a substantial part of the goods
concerned.1 3 7 Regulation 17/62,1 38 article 9(1) states that only the
Commission may grant exemptions. Denial of an exemption may
be reviewed on appeal by the Court of Justice. 3 9 On appeal, the
undertaking, i.e., the party appealing, has the burden of proving all
four conditions. 140 Thus, an exemption, "negative clearance,' 4 ' or
"comfort letter" from the Commission basically states that
although an agreement violates Section 1, the Commission will
bless the agreement because the pro-competitive effects outweigh
the anti-competitive effects. Exemptions and negative clearances
are not binding on courts but they are persuasive.
133. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERzOG, supra note 33, at 3-140 to 3-141.
134. See Id. at 3-138

135. Id.
136. Id
137.

See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 85(3).

138. Regulation 17/62, J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 2401 (March 13, 1962), amended by Regulation 59/62, J.O. COMM. EUR.
1655 (July 11, 1962) and Regulation 118/63, J.O. COMM. EUR. 2696 (November 8,
1963) [hereinafter Regulation 17/62].

139. Dara, supra note 110, at 771,
140. Id.
141. A negative clearance is a final act in which the Commission states that
article 85(1) does not apply to a specific agreement under the particular facts
known to it. Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 126, at 105. Also, the Commission
may issue a less formal "comfort letter" which informs the parties that article
85(1) does not seem to apply to a notified agreement or that an exemption
under article 85(3) would seemingly be available. Id.
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Registration is required for all arrangements for which exemption pursuant to article 85(3) is sought and the Commission cannot
grant an exemption without this. 142 The Commission may only give
an exemption retroactive effect back to and including the date of
registration. 143 Thus, it is advantageous to register new arrangements before they become effective.
The Commission and Court of Justice have already dealt with a
series of cases involving applications for exemptions and negative
clearances. The doctrine of economic unity has evolved from this
series of Commission decisions and Court of Justice judgments.
This doctrine emphasizes the existence of economic unity in exempting practices between undertakings from the prohibitions of
article 85.
In 0tristiani& Nielsen,'" the Commission held that a parent
company cannot compete with its subsidiaries. The Commission
granted a negative clearance on the ground that the agreement effected "only a division of labor within the same economic entity"
and therefore did "not have the object or effect of preventing, restricting, or distorting competition.' x45 It has been suggested the
better rationale in this case would have been the finding of only one
"undertaking."146
Only a year after Christiani& Nielsen, in Kodak,'147 the Commission used this "better rationale" and granted negative clearance.
Kodak concerned a request by the European subsidiaries of the
American Eastman Kodak Corporation for a negative clearance
with respect to their sales conditions in Europe.148 Once the Commission found the subsidiaries were lacking economic autonomy, it
concluded that only one enterprise was concerned. 1 4 9 In granting
the clearance, the Commission stressed the absence of an agreement or concerted practice between two or more enterprises or
undertakings. 15
When faced with a similar issue in Beguelin Import Co. v.
S.A.G.L. Import-Export,151 the Court of Justice followed the analysis of Christiani& Nielsen rather than Kodak. In Beguelin Import
Co., a Japanese producer of lighters had Beguelin, a Belgian com142. See Regulation 17/62, supra note 138, at arts. 4(1), 5(1).
143. See Id. at art. 6(1).
144. 12 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 165) 12 (1969).
145. Id.
146. See 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-98.
147. 14 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 153) 14 (1970), Common Mkt Rep. (CCH)

9378 (June 30, 1970).
148. Ward, supra note 123, at 383.
149. Id. at 384.
150. Kodak, 14 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L153) 25.
151. 1971 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 949, 11 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 81.
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pany, as its exclusive distributor for Belgium and France. 1 5 2 Beguelin then assigned its rights to distribute in France to its wholly
54
owned French subsidiary. 5 3 The District Court of Nice asked'
the Court of Justice if the transfer of the exclusive distributorship
violated article 85. The Court found the parties could not possibly
compete, stating:
Article 85(1) prohibits agreements which have as their object or effect
an impediment to competition. This is not the position in the case of an
exclusive sales agreement when in fact the concession granted under
that agreement is in part transferred from the parent company to a
subsidiary which, although
having separate legal personality, enjoys no
155
economic independence.

Thus, the "economic unity doctrine" was formed.
Questions remains. as to the scope of this doctrine. However,
factors which point towards economic unity are the complete ownership of capital (e.g. wholly owned subsidiaries) and the parent
company's power to control the subsidiary's management. 1'
2.2.4 Article 85 Compared to Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Both Article 85 of the EEC Treaty and the Section 1 of the
Sherman Act forbid only activities performed by two or more persons or entities. The United States Supreme Court and the Court of
Justice agree that wholly owned subsidiaries and their parent companies cannot violate the Sherman Act or the EEC Treaty, respec-

tively. 157 However, for a conspiracy, the Supreme Court has
required clear and convincing evidence of "conscious parallelism,"' lse while the Court of Justice has been satisfied with a lesser
5 9
degree of proof, at least in the presence of parallel behavior.1
2.2.5

EEC Treaty Article 86

Article 86 outlaws abuse of a dominant market position. Because national barriers had been large enough to significantly impede the development of enterprises into "large" enterprises,
152. Id at 951, 11 COMMON MKT. L. REV.at 83.
153. Id.
154. This was done pursuant to article 177 of the EEC Treaty.
155. 1971 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 949, 958, 11 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 81, 95.
156. Ward, supra note 123, at 390-91.
157. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984)
("the very notion of agreement in Sherman Act terms between a parent and
wholly owned subsidiary lacks meaning"); Beguelin Import Co. v. S.A.G.L. Import-Export, 1971 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 949, 11 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 81.22
158. See, e.g., Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing
Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954) (the Supreme Court has "never held that proof of a
parallel business behavior conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense").
159. Dara, supra note 110, at 775.
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monopolization of a market was not an imminent danger. 16° Thus,
monopolization or attempts to monopolize were not outlawed by
the EEC Treaty. 16 1 In fact, an important goal of the EEC Treaty
was to eliminate national barriers in order to permit the development of enterprises of a size that would bring the benefits generally
associated with large enterprises to the Community. 162 Although
national courts have been applying article 86 increasingly, 163 the
Court of Justice is the ultimate judge of what is an abuse of a dominant market position.164
The Court of Justice has stated that an enterprise has a dominant position when it has "the power to prevent effective competition" in a substantial part of the relevant market. 165 As a general
rule, abuse of this amount of power, regardless of how the requisite
market control was acquired, 166 is a violation of article 86. Thus,
the grant of a patent by a Member State is taken into account when
determining whether the owner has a dominant position. 167 However, owning industrial property does not necessarily imply a dominant position because the dominance must be in a "substantial part"
of the Common Market.1' 8 Information such as the "existence and
position of manufacturers or distributors distributing similar or
substitute goods must also be considered.' 6 9 Also, in addressing
the issue of what constituted "abuse" as per article 86, and of much
interest to assignees of patents, the Court of Justice said "[t]he fact
that the selling price of a patented product is higher than that of a
non-patented product coming from another Member State does not
necessarily constitute abuse."'1 70 The Court of Justice then blurred
the already illegible line in Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v. MetroSB GrossmarkteGmbH & Co. KG when it stated "[t]he price level of
160. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-244.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id,
Id,at 3-245.
Id
See Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda GmbH, Case No. 40/70, Feb. 18, 1971, 17 Rec. 69

(1971), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8101, 10 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 260 (1971);
Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v. Metro-SB Grossmarkte GmbH & Co. KG,
Case No. 78/70, June 8, 1971, 17 Rec 487 (1971), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8106, 10 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 631 (1971).
166. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-255.
167. Id.
168. Article 86 of the treaty states that an abuse may be in an undertaking
with a "dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of
it .. " EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 86.
169. Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda GmbH, Case No. 40/70, Feb. 18, 1971, 17 Rec. 69
(1971), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8101, 10 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 260 (1971).
170. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, Case No. 24/67, Feb. 29, 1968, 14 Rec. 81
(1968), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8054, 7 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 47 (1968);
Deutsche Grammophon GmbH, Case No. 78/70, June 8, 1971, 17 Rec.487 (1971),
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8106, 10 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 631 (1971).
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a product is not in itself necessarily indicative of an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86, but it can be a decisive indication when it is particularly high and is not justified by the
facts." 171 Thus, the Court has given the practitioner vague language to work with that may only become more concrete with the
addition of more case law.
2.2.6 Article 86 Compared to Section 2 of the Sherman Act
In determining violations of Article 86 or Section 2, the Court
of Justice and the Supreme Court, respectively, use basically the
same analysis. 172 Each court defines the relevant product market,
the relevant geographic market, and then assesses the power of the
alleged violator within the market. 173 Thus, as in United States
law, the party that is able to define the relevant product and geographic markets most advantageously and persuasively is likely to
prevail.
The Court of Justice seems inclined to use the interchangeabil174
ity of products as the test for determining the product market,
In Continental Can Co. v. Commission,175 the Court of Justice reversed the Commission's imposition of sanctions for the alleged monopolization of the light metal can market used to preserve fish and
meat. The Court reasoned that there was no proof "that competitors in other fields in the market for light metal containers cannot,
by a mere adaptation, enter this market with sufficient strength to
form a serious counterweight.' 1 76 Thus, the Court of Justice seems
to look at entry barriers when considering antitrust monopolization
1 77
violations, just as the Supreme Court does.
However, the interchangeability test may be inadequate when
courts attempt to apply it to goods with more than one use. The
Court of Justice had occasion to do this in Hoffman-La Roche v.
78
Commission.1
The Commission charged Hoffman-La Roche with
violating article 86 with respect to the vitamin market. Hoffman-La
Roche raised the defense that certain vitamins could be used for
industrial purposes as antioxidants. 1 79 The Court of Justice, due to
171. See Deutsche Grammophon GmbH, Case No. 78/70, June 8, 1971, 17 Rec.
487 (1971), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8106, 10 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 631
(1971); 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-265.
172. See generally Dara, supra note 110, at 777-88.
173. Id. at 782.
174. Dara, supra note 110, at 777.
175. Case No. 6/72, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 1973 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 199.
176. 1973 COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 227.
177. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 572 (1966) (discussing
entry barriers).
178. Case No. 85/76, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 3 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 211 (1979).
179. 3 COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 271 (1979).
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the inadequacy of the interchangeability test in this situation, failed
to address the issue directly and chose to rely on other aspects of
the case to affirm the Commission's decision.18 0
The Court of Justice, just like the Supreme Court, also requires
defining the geographic market. So far, the Court takes into account the geographic area in which the product is marketed and the
incidence of the product within the Common Market as a whole. 81'
On the other hand, the Supreme Court's determination of a geographic market is affected by accounting for the areas in which
competition is eliminated. 8 2
Finally, the Court of Justice has held that "a position of economic strength... which enables it to prevent effective competition
..by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers"' 8 3 is a high enough degree of economic power to trigger the
application of article 86. The Court has held that many factors can
be taken into account when determining whether a degree of economic power is sufficient to trigger an article 86 violation.8 4 The
Court has held that an extensive and efficient sale network 8 5 and
an industrial property right,1s 6 among other things, can be relevant
indicia of the existence of monopoly power. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has defined monopoly power as "the power to control prices or to exclude competition. ' 18 7 Additionally, in order to
trigger section 2 of the Sherman Act, specific intent to monopolize,
as opposed to "growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident" must be
shown.188
2.3 Execution of EEC Antitrust Law
Article 87 of the EEC Treaty gives the Council the power to
adopt whatever rules are appropriate, either in the form of directives or regulations, to further the principles embodied in Articles
85 and 86.189 Article 87 provides that the Council, unanimously,
shall adopt all appropriate rules within three years after the Treaty
180. See Dara, supra note 110, at 778.
181. See id. at 778-79.

182. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357-59 (1963).
183. United Brands v. Commission, Case No. 27/76, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 227, 1
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 429, 486-87 (1978).

184. See generally Dara, supra note 110, at 779.
185. Hoffman-La Roche, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 3 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 211 (1979).

186. Huhin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, Case No. 22/78, 1979 E.C.R.
1865, 3 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 345, 373 (1979).
187. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
188. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
189. 3 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-294.
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becomes effective. Although the first regulation for application of
articles 85 and 86, namely Regulation 17/62, addresses many important issues, it does not contain all provisions appropriate for the implementation of articles 85 and 86.190 However, the makers of the
Treaty were wise enough to have a provision for the Council, by a
qualified majority, to continue to adopt rules after the three year
period. In order to fill in the gaps during the interim period, articles 88 and 89 contain transitional law. 19 1 These articles provide for
enforcement of articles 85 and 86 while the Council is drafting a
more elaborate and detailed set of rules. 192 In fact, article 88 provides that the rules are effective only "[u]ntil the entry into force of
the provisions adopted in pursuance of article 87."
Articles 88 and 89 gave Member States full power to conduct
investigations and make reasoned findings of violations of articles
85 and 86. However, Regulation 17/62 gives the Commission full
power to apply articles 85(1) and 86 and exclusive power to apply
article 85(3) and leaves Member States only limited power to act,
93
and then only until the Commission has initiated a proceeding.'
Pursuant to article 89, the Commission may only investigate
upon request of a Member State or upon its own motion. Regulafrom aution 17/62 allows the Commission to request information
194
to visit
thorities of the Member States and from enterprises,
195
and to conduct general
enterprises and check books and records,
investigations of particular sectors of the economy. 196 Although it
seems the Commission can do no wrong during an investigation, all
investigations are subject to limitations and formalities that the
Commission must comply with.197
A private person or corporation cannot instigate an investigation. Although this apparent limitation seems insignificant because
190. Id,
191. Id. at 2-314.
192. Id. However, it is not reasonable to construe article 88 to be effective
until all measures ever to be based on article 87 had been adopted. Id. at 3-318.
A reasonable construction of article 88 is that it shall continue in effect until an
implementing measure based on article 87 provides for proper administrative
and enforcement procedures. Id, at 3-318 to 3-319. Since Regulation 17/62,
supra note 138, provides such procedures, article 88 should have lost its effect as
of March 13, 1962. However, the text of article 88 is incorporated into article
9(3) of Regulation 17/62, and therefore, the article is not yet totally obsolete.
193. 3 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-329.
194. Regulation 17/62, supra note 138, at art. 11.
195. Id. at art. 14.
196. Id. at art. 12.
197. See generally 3 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 3-333 to 3-339
(discussing that the Commission may only conduct "necessary" investigations,
potential problems with unreasonable search and seizures in addition to other
privileges, and the Commission's basis to provide a legal basis and purpose for
the requested information).
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the Commission has found reason to investigate on its own motion
after complaints of private persons or corporations, 9 ' it is not.'91
Even if the Commission eventually prevails and a fine is imposed,
the Commission has no jurisdiction to compensate the victim who
prodded the Commission to initiate the investigation. 2°° Any damages that the injured party may receive will result from a proceed20
ing in a Member State's court. '
2.4

Implications of the Antitrust Laws

The main objective of the EEC Treaty is to promote the free
movement of goods.20 2 The purpose of free movement of goods is to
promote competition which, in turn, increases economic efficiency. 20 3 Enterprises that even indirectly affect commerce within
the Common Market are subject to antitrust scrutiny, even if all
enterprises involved in the anti-competitive conduct and the place
where the agreement is reached and/or executed are outside the
Common Market. Therefore, to ensure economic efficiency, the
EEC seems to be moving in the direction of a "commerce clause"
analysis, where almost anything can and will be found to affect
trade between Member States. In fact, although there are no clear
indications that the Court of Justice has accepted the "effect doctrine," 204 it has been suggested that the Commission seems to have
adopted the "effect doctrine," under which "an agreement, wherever made, that may reasonably be expected to have substantial effects in the common market infringes Article 85(1). ' 205 Thus, many
unsuspecting corporations have already been thrown into the Common Market melting pot and should be wary of the antitrust laws.
Also, although similar in some respects, the differences in the
American and EEC antitrust statutes reflect the difference in the
philosophies of the two systems. 2° 6 The EEC must be flexible, in
order to achieve the integration of many national markets into one.
198. Id. at 3-331.
199. See Jacobs, supra note 112, at 1367.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 3 (stating the activities of the Community shall include, among other things, "the elimination ... of customs duties
and of quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods").
203. Waelbroeck, Competition, Integration and Economic Efficiency in the
EECfrom the Point of View of the PrivateFirm, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1439, 1445
(1984); see also Dara, supra note 110, at 790 (stating the EEC Treaty aims to
create an integrated common market combined with economic development).
204. VerLoren van Thermaat, The Impact of the Case Law of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities on the Economic World Order, 82 MICH.
L. REV. 1422, 1437 (1984).
205. V. KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION LAW AND
PRACTICE 29 (3d ed. 1986).
206. Dara, supra note 110, at 788.

1990]

European Economic Community

Thus, the EEC antitrust provisions cannot impose criminal sanctions as the Sherman Act can. Second, under the Sherman Act,
once it is found that an agreement violates the prohibitions set by
the statute, it may only be saved if the pro-competitive effects outweigh the anti-competitive effects. 2° 7 However, in the EEC, exemptions can be granted under article 85(3) for economic reasons other
than a net positive effect on competition. Third, the Sherman Act
prohibits attempts to monopolize whereas the EEC Treaty only outlaws the abuse of a monopolistic market share. Thus, again there is
a situation where a certain restriction on competition is considered
necessarily harmful in the U.S. but may be tolerated in the EEC as
long as it promotes economic efficiency. Fourth, the EEC has a de
minimis rule which states that agreements between parties which
control only a negligible share of the market are not covered by
article 85 due to the economic weakness of the parties. 20 8 The U.S.
does not have a de minimis rule. Fifth, and perhaps most significant when considering the different philosophies of the U.S. and the
EEC is that the EEC has no "per se" rule. Although the per se rule
in the U.S. 2° 9 is not as prevalent as in years past, it is still valid. In

sum, the flexibility of the EEC antitrust provisions as compared to
the Sherman Act is a two edged sword.
Furthermore, although an injunction can be ordered against a
violator of the EEC antitrust provisions, as far as damages are concerned, businesses are in a no win situation. They may be fined by
the Commission and Court of Justice for violating the EEC Treaty,
but a violation of the EEC Treaty resulting in a loss to the business
is not compensable, unless the business proceeds independently. In
addition to the apparent fairness in redressing one who has been
unlawfully injured, permitting private damages would lead to more
vigorous enforcement of the antitrust provisions. 210 However, the
EEC has not taken this route. Therefore, without fundamental
changes in law, and attitudes among the Member States, it is doubtful that private enforcement of actions in Europe will be effec207. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
688 (stating "the Rule of Reason ... focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions").
208. Volck v. Vervaecke, Case No. 5/69, 1969 E.C.R. 295, 1969 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 273. Because the Court of Justice failed to indicate the exact share of
the market under which the de minimis rule could be invoked, the Commission
issued the Notice on Minor Agreements, O.J. [1970] C 64/1, which in its
amended form, as amended Dec. 29, 1977, O.J. [1977] C 313/3, basically exempts
from the prohibitions of article 85 agreements which affect no more than 5% of
the market, with a few other conditions. See Dara, supra note 110, at 769-71
(explaining the other conditions and giving a more detailed explanation of the
de minimis rule).
209. See e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927)
(price fixing is per se illegal under the Sherman Act).
210. Jacobs, supra note 112, at 1367.
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tive.211 Thus, it may be a gamble for a small corporation to enter
and compete in the EEC as they may not have a big enough
"warchest" to file an independent suit.
Perhaps, in striving for economic efficiency, the EEC sought to
give certain advantages to large, well established corporations because it viewed them as the ones that had survived the competition
in other parts of the world and therefore, were the most economically efficient. The doctrine of economic unity would seem to coincide with this. It seems the doctrine would encourage direct
investment in the EEC by large corporations to form wholly owned
subsidiaries in which the management of the subsidiary is controlled by the corporation. Ownership and control of management
by a large efficient company could only breed economic efficiency
and help streamline the multitude of national markets into one.

3. EEC INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAW
3.1

Background

Intellectual property protection in the United States does not
provide protection against intellectual property raiders in foreign
lands, including the EEC. Thus, United States businesses which
plan to make goods and services available in the EEC must appropriately protect their goals and services with patents, trademarks,
copyrights, and know-how. There are different avenues of protection available.
3.2

PatentProsecution

Currently, there are three ways for American business to protect patentable inventions in the EEC.2 1 2 First, one may file a national application directly in each country where protection is
desired. Second, one may file nationally and/or under European
Patent Convention ("EPC") 2 13 via the Patent Cooperation Treaty
211. Id, at 1371.
212. SCHWAAB & THURMAN, INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW: EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION & PATENT COOPERATION TREATY 1-12 (1980).
213. The European Patent Convention was signed in Munich on October 5,
1973 [hereinafter EPC]. See also K. HAERTEL, EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION
19 (V. Vossius trans. 1980). The EPC went into effect on October 7, 1977. 5 H.
SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 6-216.6. Article 133(2) of the European
Patent Convention states that:

Natural or legal persons not having either a residence or principal place of
business within the territory of one of the Contracting States must be represented by a professional representative and act through him in all proceedings established by this Convention, other than in filing the European
patent application; the Implementing Regulations may permit other
exceptions.
EPC, supra,at 133(2); K. HAERTEL, supra,at 81. Thus, a U.S. national couldfile
an EPC application directly but must appoint a professional representative
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("PCT").2 1

4

Third, one may file directly in the European Patent

Office
under the European Patent Convention. 216 Also, the
Community Patent Convention ("CPC")217 provides hope 218 for an
2 15

additional procedure to prosecute patent applications. These avenues and potential avenues of patent prosecution attempt to unify
national patent laws219 and thus, do not entail the abolition of national patent systems. 220 .
3.2.1

Direct National Filing

As a general rule, direct national filing is no longer popular
with entities seeking patent protection in the EEC. The obvious advantage to national filings is that one need not worry if a country
has acceded to the EPC or PCT; thus protection can be gained in all
EEC nations individually. However, the disadvantages of national
filings often outweigh the advantages. First, if protection is desired
in five or more EEC nations it is generally less expensive to file via
the PCT or EPC. This is due to the high filing costs and high translation costs associated with numerous national filings. 221 Second,
because the major goal of the EEC is to remove all internal barriers
which restrict the movement of goods and services, national protection in one EEC nation may not be adequate protection if another
entity is importing infringing goods from another EEC nation.
3.2.2

Patent Cooperation Treaty Filings

The PCT is a purely procedural international agreement which
provides for the filing of patent applications on the same invention
within a short period of time (usually approximately two months) which is set
by the European Patent Office. A "professional representative" must either
appear on the EPO list of representatives or be an attorney entitled to represent
a client before the Patent Office of his own country which must be a Contracting State. U.S. corporations with an established place of business within
the EEC may also be able to file under the EPC.
214. The Patent Cooperation Treaty [hereinafter PCTI concluded at Washington on June 19, 1970, was amended on October 2, 1979, was modified on February 3, 1984, and is effective January 1, 1985.
215. The European Patent Office [hereinafter EPO] is located in Munich and
has a branch office in The Hague. The official languages of the EPO are
French, English and German. SCHWAAB & THURMAN, supra note 212, at 1-16.
216. The European Patent Convention was signed in Munich on October 5,
1973. K. HAERTEL, supra note 213, at 19.
217. The Community Patent Convention [hereinafter CPC] was signed at
Luxembourg on December 15, 1975 and is published in 1976 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 17) 1 (1976). See also 5 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 6-216.19.
218. The CPC has not yet taken effect. Id. at 6-216.7.
219. See, e.g., 5 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 6-216.19.
220. Id. at 6-216.8.
221. On average, at this time, to file nationally costs approximately $2,000
per country, which includes translation and attorneys fees.
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in a number of nations. 222 The PCT enables the U.S. applicant to
file one "international application." The application can be filed in
English in the United States Patent Office ("U.S.P.T.O."), 223 which
is an official "Receiving Office." The Receiving Offices function as
the filing and formalities review organization for international applications. The application is then acknowledged as a regular national filing in as many member nations to the PCT 2 2 4 as the
applicant designates. The application receives the benefit of the
U.S. national application filing date, which is generally earlier for
U.S. applicants.
The U.S. applicant or national then has the option of the
U.S.P.T.O. or the European Patent Office ("EPO") to act as an International Searching Authority (ISA). The ISA conducts a prior
art search of the inventions claimed in the international applications by searching at least the minimum documentation defined by
the PCT.225 The ISA is responsible for checking the content of the
227
title and abstract.226 The ISA also generates a Search Report
which contains a listing of those documents found to be relevant
and identifies the claims in the application to which they are pertinent. However, no judgments or statements as to patentability are
made by the ISA. 228 The U.S. applicant receives a copy of the cited
prior art from the ISA, which in this instance is the U.S.P.T.O..
Subsequently, processing continues before the International Bureau (IB).
The IB maintains the master file of all international applications and acts as the publisher and central coordinating body under
the PCT. Normally, the applicant has two months from the transmittal date of the Search Report to amend the claims by filing an
amendment directly with the IB. 22 9 After the expiration of 18
222. SCHWAAB & THURMAN, supra note 212, at I-8.
223. See PCT, supra note 214, at art. 10.
224. Of the twelve EEC members, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland cannot be designated as nations where protection is desired with the use of a PCT
filing. West Germany, Luxembourg, Great Britain, and the Netherlands may
be covered either nationally or under the EPC via the PCT application. One
cannot get national protection in France, Italy, and Belgium via the PCT, but

protection in these nations via the PCT is available due to their accession to the
EPC. Denmark may be protected nationally via the PCT but not under the
EPC via the PCT because it has not acceded to the EPC. However, as of January 1, 1990, Denmark belongs to the EPC.
225. See PCT, supra note 214, at arts. 15-16 and PCT rule 34 for a discussion
of the international search, the ISA, and minimum search requirements.
226. See PCT rules 37.2 and 38.2.
227. This is usually done about 16 months after the priority date. See PCT
rule 42 (stating the time limit for the Search Report "shall be 3 months from
the receipt of the search copy by the International Searching Authority, or 9
months from the priority date, whichever time limit expires later").
228. See PCT rule 43.9.
229. See PCT, supra note 214, at art. 19 and PCT rule 46.
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months from the priority date of the application, the IB may publish the international application, the Search Report, and any
amendment that may have been made. 23° A copy of this publication
231
is sent to all the Designated Offices ("DO's").
The applicant must send to each DO, whether it be a national
DO or a regional DO, a copy of the international application, the
required translations, and the filing fees within 20 months of the
priority date. 232 However, DO's may unilaterally grant additional

time to applicants, but may not shorten the time afforded to applicants. 233 Once at the respective DO's, applicants may amend their
applications. 234 Then, each DO acts independently to determine the
patentability of the application based upon its own specific national
or regional laws. 235
Finally, an applicant may wish to obtain the benefits of delaying the entry into the national stage until the 30th month. This
objective is achieved by filing a demand for an international preliminary examination 236 with the appropriate International Preliminary Examining Authority (IPEA) 237 within 19 months of the
priority date. "The objective of the international preliminary examination is to formulate a preliminary and non-binding opinion of
the questions whether the claimed invention appears to be novel, to
involve an inventive step (to be non-obvious), and to be industrially
applicable.1 23 8 All nations or regions for which the preliminary examination is desired must be "elected" in the demand. 23 9 A copy of
the International Preliminary Examination Report is sent to the
applicant and to the IB, which sends copies of the report to each
elected office.
3.2.3 European Patent Convention Filings
The principal purpose of the EPC is to enable those parties who
wish to seek patent protection in a plurality of European countries 240 to file one single application covering all desired nations
designated by the applicant. 241 The ultimate goal is for each of the
230. PCT, supra note 214, at art. 21.
231. Id. at art. 20.
232. Id. at art. 22.
233. Id,at art. 22(3).
234. See PCT, supra note 214, at art. 28 and PCT Rule 52.
235. PCT, supra note 214, at art. 27(5).
236. See generally id at arts. 31-42.
237. The appropriate IPEA for U.S. applicants is the U.S.P.T.O. PCT, supra
note 214, at art. 34.
238. Id at art. 33.
239. Id. art. 31(4)(a).
240. Currently, all 12 members of the EEC have ratified and acceded to the
EPC except Portugal, Denmark, and Ireland.
241. ScHwAAB & THURMAN, supra note 212, at 1-3 to 1-4.
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member countries to adopt in its national law the same substantive
law of patents set forth in the EPC. 242 The European patent does
not result in the existence of one single unitary patent covering the
whole of the territories of the designated countries, but rather leads
to a "bundle" of national patents. 243 Each national patent is governed by the same provisions as a national patent granted directly
244
in the country concerned.
3.2.4 Potential Community Patent Convention Filings
The EPC helped unify that part of patent law that relates only
to the grant of patents. 245 However, for the EEC to fully integrate
economically, the patent laws of the Member States must be unified
beyond what was accomplished by the EPC.24 6 This is because the
existence of differing national patent laws may arbitrarily influence
the location of industrial activities. 247 Also, it has been argued that
in the absence of a community patent, owners of inventions will not
be compelled to take out patents in all EEC Member States, resulting in the restriction of competition in some parts of the EEC but
not in others. 248 Furthermore, national patent laws are an impediment to the free flow of goods between Member States, 249 a concept
essential to the EEC. Thus, unification of the national patent laws
of the EEC Member States is not only a goal in itself, but it is also a
condition precedent to the free movement of patented goods in the
2 o
EEC. 5
The Court of Justice recognized the importance of this goal as a
condition precedent to the free movement of patented goods when
it stated:
The national rules relating to the protection of industrial property
have not yet been the subject of unification within the Community. In
the absence of such unification, the national character of the protection
of industrial property and the variations between the different laws on
the subject are liable to create obstacles both to the free circulation of
products and to competition within the Common
the patented
251
Market.
242. Id. at 1-4.
243. Octrooibureau Los en Stigter, Manualfor the Handling ofApplications
for Patents,Designs and Trade Marks Throughout the World, supp. 36 (1978)
[hereinafter Manualfor World Patents].
244. EPC, supra note 213, at art. 2(2); K. HAERTEL, supra note 213, at 28.
245. 5 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 6-216.19.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 6-216.20.
249. Id.
250. 5 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 6-216.25.
251. Parke Davis & Co. v. Porbel, Case No. 24/67, 14 Rec. 81, 83, 1968 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 47, 49 (1968).
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The first step towards this goal was the signing of the Community
Patent Convention ("CPC") on December 15, 1975 in Luxembourg.
Although not yet ratified,252 the CPC is closer to becoming a reality
with the ratification of the EPC.
253
The CPC will require ratification of all the EEC countries.
The basic institution of the CPC will be the EPO, which has already
been established by the EPC.254 However, in addition to the EPO,
the CPC provides for a Patent Administration Division to keep special records of Community Patents, and Revocation Divisions and
256
Boards, 255 among other things.
A CPC patentee will have the right to prevent others from
making, using, or selling a patented product. 257 The patentee can
25 8
also prevent importation of such products for these purposes.
The CPC also gives the patentee rights to prevent third parties
from committing acts similar to what is commonly known as contributory infringement and inducing infringement.2 59 The CPC
does not grant the patentee the right to prevent acts done privately
and for noncommercial purposes or experimental acts, in addition
to other acts. 26° National courts will have jurisdiction over matters
261
relating to infringement of these rights.
3.3

Copyrights

Copyright protection for authors who are Member State nationals in EEC nations is available merely by publication and without formalities such as notice and deposit of copies of works.
Protection in EEC member nations and other foreign nations was
not easily available to U.S. authors until recent legislation was
passed.
252. See SCHWAAB & THURMAN, supra note 212, at II-1; United States Trademark Association, International Bulletin Vol. 44, No. 15, at 1-2, May 9, 1989.
253. See CPC, supra note 217, at art. 94. The EPC did not require ratification
by all EEC countries. See EPC, supra note 213, at art. 169; K. HAERTEL, supra
note 213, at 100.
254. SCHWAAB & THURMAN, supra note 212, at 11-5. EPC, supra note 213, at
arts. 10-25 establish the EPO. See also K. HAERTEL, supra note 213, at 30-7.
255. CPC, supra note 217, at arts. 7-13.
256. See generally SCHWAAB & THURMAN, supra note 212, at 11-5 to 11-6 (for a
list of other institutional provisions the CPC will have).
257. Id. at 11-9.
258. Id.
259. See CPC, supra note 217, at art. 30.
260. SCHWAAB & THURMAN, supra note 212, at II-10 to II-11.

261. Id. at 11-13.
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The Berne Convention

The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,262 which
became effective on March 1, 1989,263 amends Title 17 of the United
States Code dealing with copyrights. Although the price was costly
as the U.S. had to abandon its formalities in acceding to the Berne
Convention, 26 becoming a member nation to the Berne Convention
will benefit the U.S. in two basic ways. First, adherence to the convention establishes copyright relations between the U.S. and
2 65
twenty-four countries with which it had no copyright relations.
This will help the U.S. voice its opinion in the effective establishment and management of international copyright policy, 2 6 6 and perhaps policies on copyright law that will evolve in the EEC. Second,
and of more immediate importance for U.S. copyright claimants
currently seeking protection in EEC nations, the U.S. copyright
claimant will no longer need to employ the "back door" procedure
2 67
for obtaining copyright protection in Berne Convention nations.
Because the Berne Convention only protects works of non-Berne
nationals in Berne nations if the work is published simultaneously
in both a Berne and non-Berne nation, 268 U.S. copyright claimants
previously had to publish simultaneously in, for instance, Canada.
This difficult and expensive procedure is no longer necessary.
3.4

Trademarks

Currently, businesses seeking trademark protection in EEC
Member States must file a separate application in each country, ex262. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (1988) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq. (1988) [hereinafter 1988
Act]. The 1988 Act contains thirteen sections. Currently, there are 79 members
that have acceded to the Berne Convention with the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China being the most notable exceptions. Strauss, Don't Be
Burned By Berne: A Guide to the Changes in the Copyright Laws as a Result of
the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 71 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 374,
374 (1989).
263. 1988 Act, supra note 262, at § 13(a).
264. The U.S. copyright laws needed to be restructured to conform to the
Berne Convention requirements. "The central feature of the Berne Convention
is its prohibition of formalities.". 134 CONG. REC. H3082 (daily ed. May 10, 1988)
(statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). The previous feature distinguishing United
States copyright law from those of the nations that had acceded to the Berne
Convention was the U.S.'s emphasis on formalities, i.e. notice and registration. 3
M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.01[B][1] (1989). Thus,
the limitation or elimination of formalities of the new law is its most important
revision. Id.
265. Strauss, supra note 262, at 378.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Berne Convention of 1886, September 9, 1886, art. 3(1)(b). See generally
S. RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 §§ 5.16-18 (1987).

1990]

European Economic Community

cept Benelux, which covers Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The businesses must be aware of what, if anything, certain
words or expressions may mean in other languages. Although presently there are no uniform requirements and standards for the registration, enforcement and licensing of trademarks and service
marks, the EEC's Council has taken a large step in that direction.
3.4.1

The Council's Directive

The Council took the first step towards the establishment of a
Community Trade Mark (CTM) on December 21, 1988, when it issued a Directive instructing its Member States to harmonize their
national trademark laws by December 28, 1991.269 The CTM will
probably be operational by 1992.270
The Directive is aimed at reducing the effect of the national
application of trademark law when it would restrict the free flow of
goods within the EEC. 27 1 Article 1 of the Directive provides that
trademarks, service marks, collective and guarantee or certification
marks will be registerable in all Member States. Article 2 of the
Directive lists what a mark can consist of.2 72 Article 9 provides for
cancellation due to non-use after a five year period. Article 10 provides that a prior registrant cannot bar the use of a confusingly similar mark registered subsequent to its own if it has been used for
five years with the earlier registrant's knowledge. In addition to
other reasons, a mark may be refused registration or cancelled
under articles 3 and 4 of the Directive if there is an "earlier"
mark.2 7 3 Finally, article 6.2 provides that common law rights will
not be displaced by the CTM but they will be limited in territory.
269. United States Trademark Association, International Bulletin Vol. 44,
No. 15, p. 1, May 9, 1989 [hereinafter USTAIB].
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1-2.
272. A mark may consist of any sign capable of being represented graphically, including words, personal names, designs, and product and packaging
shapes, provided they are capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods or
services from those of others. Id. at 2. This may cause some problems, especially in the United Kingdom where neither the shape of goods nor their packaging can be registered as a trademark per se. Trademarks-Harminozation
Directive and Proposals for a Community Trademark, EC-US BUSINEss REPORT, Vol. I, No. 5, Oct. 1, 1989 at 8. (available at authors' office) [hereinafter
EC-US]. Under the Directive, objects previously unregisterable in the United
Kingdom, such as the shape of a Coca-Cola bottle, would become registerable.
Id.
273. "Earlier" marks are those with a
[P]riority, filing or registration date prior to that of the mark which have
protection in the [E]EC, an [E]EC member state, the Benelux Trade Mark
Office, or under international arrangements (e.g. Madrid) which have effect in a member state; or are considered 'well known' under Article 6bis of
the Paris Convention in a member state.
USTAIB, supra note 269, at 2.
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Currently, the EEC is working on a draft of the Regulation
which would govern CTM's. This proposed Regulation is independent of the Directive. The draft provides that a CTM issue only if
the mark is available for registration in all Member States. 274 However, rejection of an application due to prior rights in one or more
Member States does not defeat the applicant's right to register, but
it does force the applicant to convert the application to a "bundle"
of national applications. 275 Also, national rights could be transferred by the owner to the CTM register. 276 Finally, marks are
slated to be valid for 10 years. 277 There are a few obstacles the
EEC must overcome in establishing a CTM. First, the EEC must
establish the location for a CTM2 7 8 office and official language(s) of
the CTM. 2 7 9 Second, although the draft of the regulation does not
provide for one, the EEC must consider a Community Trade Mark
Court of Appeals to ensure uniform application of the laws and to
avoid forum shopping. 28 0 Speedy compliance by Member States
may make the CTM a reality by 1992.281
3.5

Licensing IndustrialProperty

Although articles 30-34 contain seemingly absolute language,
they are not intended to deprive the Member States of all power to
restrict imports and exports. 28 2 As to intellectual property, article
36 of the EEC Treaty provides that the free movement of goods
shall not preclude "prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports
or goods in transit justified on grounds of... the protection of industrial and commercial property," if not an arbitrary discrimination or disguised restriction on trade between Member States. In
attempting to define with more precision the areas article 36 leaves
to the Member States to regulate, the Court of Justice has looked at
the Treaty as a whole. 28 3 Thus, as the Court of Justice has held on
numerous occasions, article 36 enables Member States to enforce
274. Id at 3.

275.
276.
277.
278.

Id
Id.
Id.
The leading contenders where the office may be located are Madrid,

London and Rome. EC-US, supra note 272, at 8.
279. USTAIB, supra note 269, at 4.
280. Id, Forum shopping may create a problem because the draft provides
that venue in infringement matters may be found in the country where the acts
are either threatened or occurring. Id.
281. Spain has already adopted a new trademark act which took effect on
May 12, 1989. Id. at 5.
282. 1 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 2-156.5 to 2-156.6. Clearly
the intent to take away all regulatory powers is absent since, for example, the

Treaty did not transfer national sovereignty over public health and safety to the
Community, even though this could be done under article 100. Id
283. Id.
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their national laws for the protection of patents, trademarks, copyrights and other commercial property but only within the limita2s 4
tions of other Treaty provisions.
3.5.1

The Commission's IndustrialProperty Licensing
Regulation

Even though article 36 gives no Community body the power to
enact measures more closely defining the terms in it, the Commission issued a regulation on the licensing of intellectual property in
July, 1984.285 The Regulation took effect on January 1, 1985, expires on December 31, 1994,286 and exempts license agreements
which meet certain qualifying criteria from the purview of some of
the EEC's antitrust laws.
3.5.1.1

Scope of the Regulation

The Regulation's scope is limited in a number of important
ways. First, the Regulation may only exempt agreements between
two enterprises. 28 7 Thus, even if an agreement falls within the Regulation, the agreement is not subject to article 85(1) but is still subject to article 86, which is the antitrust provision prohibiting an
abuse of a dominant market position by one or more enterprises.
Second, the Commission may withdraw the benefit of the block exemption when it finds that an exempted agreement has certain effects that are incompatible with the conditions established in article
85(3) of the EEC Treaty.288 Third, pure sales agreements are not
covered by this exemption 28 9 but may be covered by exemptions for
284. Consten & Grunden v. Commission, Cases Nos. 56 and 58/64, July 13,
1966, 12 Rec. 429 (1966), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8046, 5 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 418 (1966). See also Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v. Metro-SB Gross-

markte GmbH & Co., KG, Case No. 78/70, June 8, 1970, 17 Rec. 487 (1971), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8106, 10 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 631 (1971)
(manufacturer of records in one Member State could not prohibit the re-import
of records he had voluntarily exported to another Member State by asserting a
violation of the first Member State's national copyright laws); Sirena S.r.l. v.
Eda GmbH, Case No. 40/70, Feb. 18, 1971, 17 Rec. 69 (1971), Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8101, 10 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 260 (1971) (licensee of trademark in
one Member State cannot prevent the importation into that country of products
made by a different licensee in another Member State).
285. Regulation No. 2349/84, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 219) 15 (1984), Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2747 (1984) [hereinafter Regulation 2349/84].
286. Regulation No. 2349/84, supra 285, at art. 14.
287. Id. at art. 1(1).
288. Id. at art. 9. Specifically, the Commission can withdraw an exemption
when the licensor does not have the right to terminate the exclusivity granted
to the licensee despite the licensee's failure to exploit adequately the patent or
the licensee's refusal to meet unsolicited demand from outside its territory
without valid reason. Id. at art. 9(3)-(4). Perhaps this is because these situations do not benefit the public.
289. Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 285, at art. 9.
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exclusive distribution agreements. 29° Fourth, the Regulation does
not apply to licensing agreements entered into in connection with
joint ventures. 291 Finally, although the Regulation applies to mixed
patent and know-how licenses provided the communicated knowhow is secret and permits a better exploitation of the licensed pat293
ents, 292 it does not apply to pure know-how license agreements.
Other exemptions may apply to pure know-how license agreements.294 The know-how must be "necessary" 295 for achieving the
objects of the licensed technology. Thus, the know-how need not be
less important than the patented aspects of the technology but must
296
just be connected with the patent.
3.5.1.2

Substance of the Regulation

The Regulation divides licensing clauses into three groups. The
"permitted list" consists of clauses that may infringe article 85(1)
but are exempt from its purview. The "white list" consists of
clauses that are common to patent license agreements but generally
do not infringe article 85(1) and are worthy of exemption in those
cases where they do infringe. The "black list" describes clauses that
generally restrict competition and will prevent the granting of a
block exemption.
The "permitted list" allows for two restrictions on the licensor
and five restrictions on the licensee. A licensor may be restricted
from granting other licenses 297 or from itself exploiting the licensed
invention. 298 The licensee may be restricted from exploiting the li290. See Commission Reg. (EEC) No. 1983/83, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173)
(June 30, 1983).
291. Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 285, at art. 9.
292. Id. at art. 1(1).
293. Id. It was estimated in 1979 that 25% of all international technology
licehses were straight know-how licenses and another 42% were mixed patent/know-how licenses. Rosen, Licensing Restrictionsin the U.S.and the European Economic Community, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 383, 394, app. A (1986)
(appendix contains the Comments of the American Bar Association Section of
Antitrust Law with Respect to Issuance by the Commission of the European
Communities of Regulations or Guidelines Applicable to the Licensing of
Know-How).
294. The exemption for pure know-how licenses was accomplished via a
commission Regulation, No. 556/89 of November 30, 1988. See O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L61) 1 (1989). The draft basically follows the model of the block exemption for patent licensing agreements.
295. Id. Earlier drafts of the Regulation had required the know-how to be
"ancillary" to the licensed patent, but this requirement was dropped. Coleman
& Schmitz, supra note 126, at 111. It has been suggested that this was done so
that the relative importance of the patent and the know-how will not affect the
block exemption. Corones, The European Commission's Approach to KnowHow Licensing: A Critical Commentary, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 181 (1984).
296. Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 126, at 111.
297. Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 285, at art. 1(1)(1).
298. Id. at art. 1(1)(2).
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censed invention in the territories reserved for the licensor.299
Also, a licensee may be prohibited from manufacturing or using the
licensed product in the territories reserved for other licensees. 3° °
However, the licensee is not precluded from selling in another licensee's territory. This is probably because the only way the licensee could compete, considering transportation costs, is if he could
make the product at a lower cost than the licensee of the area he is
importing into. Thus, this permitted action by the licensee would
tend to increase the economic efficiency of the EEC. Further, a licensee may be required to use the licensor's trademark, provided
the licensee is permitted to identify itself as the manufacturer. 30 1
Further, the licensee may be prohibited from implementing an "active sales" policy 30 2 in territories licensed to other licensees. 30 3 Finally, a "passive sales" restriction may prohibit a licensee from
accepting unsolicited offers from the territories of other EEC licen3 4
sees for a five year period.
The "white list" contains eleven clauses30 5 common to licensing
agreements that will not be considered in violation of article 85(1).
Clauses permitted are ones which: (1) require the licensee to procure goods or services from the licensor or its appointee if such
products or services are "necessary" for a technically satisfactory
exploitation of the licensed product; (2) require the licensee to pay a
minimum royalty or produce minimum quantities of the licensed
product; (3) restrict the licensees technical field of use; (4) restrict
the licensee from exploiting the patent after the termination of the
agreement insofar as the patent is still in force;s3 (5) restrict the
licensee from granting sublicenses or assigning the license; (6) require the licensee to mark the goods with the patentee's name; (7)
require the licensee not to divulge know-how given by the licensor,
even after the license has expired; (8) impose an obligation on the
299. Id. at art. 1(1)(3). This basically means that a licensee may be prohibited from making, using or selling the licensed invention where the licensor has
patent protection and has not granted any licenses. Coleman & Schmitz, supra

note 126, at 112.
300. Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 285, at art. 1(1)(4).
301. Id. at art. 1(1)(7).
302. An "active sales" policy includes advertising specifically directed at ter-

ritories licensed to other licensees or the establishment of a branch or the maintenance of a depot in such a territory. Id. at art. 1(1)(5).

303. Id.
304. Id. at art. 1(1)(6). The five year period begins to run as soon as the product is placed on the EEC market for the first time by the licensor or one of its
licensees. Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 126, at 112.
305. The eleven clauses are listed in Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 285,
at art. 2(1).
306. This only applies to patents, and therefore, it is unclear whether a licensee may be prevented from exploiting know-how after the termination of an
agreement. Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 126, at 113.
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licensee to help stop and prosecute infringements without relinquishing the licensee's right to challenge the validity of the licensed
patent; (9) impose an obligation on the licensee to maintain minimum quality, provided it is necessary for the technically satisfactory exploitation of the licensed invention; (10) impose an
obligation on the licensor and licensee to exchange experiences
gained in exploiting the licensed invention and to grant mutual
licenses for improvements and new applications on a non-exclusive
basis; and (11) impose an obligation on the licensor to grant the licensee terms as favorable as terms that other licensees may receive.
The "black list" contains eleven clauses that are not part of the
Regulation's block exemption and are thus subject to article 85(1).
Article 3 of the Regulation, or the "black list," prohibits clauses
which: (1) prohibit challenging the licensed patent;30 7 (2) continue a
license beyond the expiration of patents existing at the time of the
license, 30 8 although royalties may be charged for the continued use
of know-how; s 09 (3) restrict competition between the parties as to
research and development, manufacture, use or sales, with some exceptions;3 10 (4) charge royalties on products not entirely patented or
manufactured by a licensed process, or charge royalties for the use
of know-how in the common domain, with some exceptions; 311 (5)
limit the quantity of a product which may be produced; 312 (6) restrict prices; 313 (7) restrict customers; 3 14 (8) impose an obligation to
assign improvements or new patent applications; 3 15 (9) impose an
obligation to take a license under patents which the licensee does
not want in order to get a license under patents the licensee
wants;3 16 (10) prevent the licensee from placing its product in the
market of another licensee for more than 5 years; 317 and (11) require a licensee, without good reason, to refuse to sell in his terri307. Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 285, at art. 3(1).
308. Id. at art. 3(2).
309. Fugate, Antitrust Aspects of InternationalPatent and Technology Licensing, 5 J.L. COM. 433, 448 n.98 (1985).
310. Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 285, at art. 3(3). The exceptions are
those that are provided for in article 1.
311. Id. art. 3(4). Charging royalties may be extended past the expiration
date of a patent or the entry of know-how into the public domain to help the
licensee make payments. Fugate, supra note 309, at 448 n.100.
312. Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 285, at art. 3(5).
313. Id.at art 3(6).
314. Id. at art. 3(7).
315. Regulation No. 2349/84, supra note 285, at art. 3(8).
316. Id. at art. 3(9). This can be done, however, if the other patents, products
or services are "necessary" for a technically satisfactory exploitation of the licensed invention. Id.
317. Id. at art. 3(10). Compare with id. at art. 1(1)(6) (permitting a clause
preventing a licensees product from being placed in another licensee's market
for up to 5 years).
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tory to those who would market in another territory, or to make it
difficult for such persons to obtain products from other resellers
318
within the EEC.
3.5.1.3

Notification Under the Regulation

The Regulation generally requires, via the procedure enounced
in article 4, that the parties to a licensing agreement must notify the
Commission of their agreement if it does not exclusively contain
''319
clauses described in the "white list" and/or the "permitted list.
Agreements that contain clauses described only in the "permitted
list" and/or the "white list" and no clauses described in the "black
list" are automatically exempt from the ambit of article 85(1) but
are still subject to the purview of article 86.320
Since 1962, only about 10% of the agreements notified to the
Commission have been ruled on due to limited staff and resources. 32 1 Even if the Commission rules on your notification, it
will take at least 10 months, and yet can take as long as 4 years; on
average it takes about 2 years for a ruling, depending on the complexity of the case. 3 2 2 Therefore, the notification procedure is
something that businesses should try to avoid.
3.6 Implications
The PCT simplifies foreign filings of patent applications and
reduces the costs by avoiding duplication of multiple filings and
search efforts. 323 Additionally, by postponing the requirement for
filing translations of an application until after the search results are
known, the applicant who decides not to continue prosecution of his
application in several initially designated countries is afforded fur324
ther savings.
The EPC affords the U.S. applicant advantages over direct national filings. First, the general school of thought is that if protection is desired in five or more countries, EPC filings are more
economical. This is because the application is filed in English, and
presumably the applicant has already filed in the United States.
Second, once the patent issues, the applicant pays to translate only
the claims into languages of the nations providing protection. Not
only is it less costly to translate only the claims as opposed to the
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
C 255)
323.
324.

Id,at art. 3(11).
Coleman & Schmitz, supra note 126, at 118-19.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 105.
Answer to Parliamentary Question No. 173/85, 28 O.J.
27 (1985), [1985] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10731.
SCHWAAB & THURMAN, supra note 212, at 1-8.
Id.

EUR. COMM.

(No.
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entire application, but this cost is only incurred once the application
is allowed. Thus, in addition to deferring possible translation costs,
the EPC filing method gives the applicant a much greater chance of
recouping the translation costs, since the issued patent presumably
has a value. Third, while infringement of an EPC patent is tried in
courts, issues of validity are determined by the EPO. Thus, the defense of invalidity in a patent infringement suit may prove less effective because courts will not generally stay the infringement
determination pending the outcome of the validity issue at the EPO.
This may be invaluable to the plaintiff alleging patent
infringement.
However, the EPC applicant must be aware of a potential pitfall of EPO filings. If an application is rejected under the seemingly
higher patentability standards used by the EPO, the applicant cannot register nationally. Thus, all national rights in EPC countries
would be lost.
The CPC provides a potential avenue for prospective patentees
in EEC countries. The doctrine of exhaustion 325 enounced in the
CPC basically states that after a first valid sale within the Common
Market, a patented product or a product manufactured by a patented process will circulate freely throughout the EEC insofar as
patent law is concerned 326 because the patentee has "exhausted" his
rights. The doctrine of exhaustion only applies to intra-EEC
trade 327 and does not apply to products manufactured and sold
under a compulsory license. 328 Thus, a CPC patentee will still be
entitled to prevent goods from abroad from being introduced into
the EEC, even if they originate in a territory where a parallel patent is in force.3 2 9 This seems justified 330 because a CPC patentee
who fails to manufacture the patented product or put the patented
process to use within the EEC risks others receiving compulsory
licenses for lack or insufficiency of exploitation. 331 The "requirement" of maintaining manufacturing facilities within the EEC
325. The doctrine of exhaustion is contained in article 32 of the CPC and

states:
The rights conferred by a Community patent shall not extend to acts concerning a product covered by that patent which are done within the territories of the contracting states after that product has been put on the market
in one of these states by the proprietor of the patent or with his express
consent, unless there are grounds which, under Community law, would justify the extension to such acts of the rights conferred by the patent.
The "rights conferred by a Community patent" are basically listed in article 29
of the CPC. CPC, supra note 217, at art. 29.
326. See 5 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 6-216.41.
327. Id.
328. CPC, supra note 217, at art. 46.
329. 5 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 6-216.41.
330. Id. at 6-216.42.
331. See CPC, supra note 217, at art. 47.

1990]

European Economic Community

seems quite protectionist as it may force the production of a patented invention inside the Common Market at a cost higher than
that which would be incurred if the patentee were allowed to manu3 32
facture the product outside the EEC and import into the EEC.
Thus, patent licensing becomes quite important.
Patent licensing agreements in the EEC are the subject of
much controversy and confusion. 333 However, the Commission's licensing Regulation helped clarify matters. 334 The Commission generally permits exclusive licenses covering the entire EEC when
they involve "the introduction and protection of a new technology
in the licensed territory" 335 or the "introduction and protection of a
new process for manufacturing a product which is already
known" 336 subject to a subsequent decisions by the Court of Justice. 337 Territorial restrictions within the EEC relating to the manufacture, use, sale, or advertising of the licensed goods are
permitted as long as parallel patents protect the licensed products
in the restricted territories.33 8 However, the EEC fears that territorial restraints coupled with know-how licensing may be used as a
subterfuge to create cartels. 339 Customer restrictions generally fall
outside the Regulation and therefore, are not exempt from article
85(1).340 However, field of use restrictions for technical fields are
acceptable. 341 Also, clauses which prohibit licensees from the manufacture, sale, or development of competing products fall outside
the block exemption. 342 Further, although price recommendation
is not prohibited, price fixing does not fall within the Regulation's
block exemption. 343 Finally, prohibitions on maximum quantities, 3 44 licensee estoppel, 345 the tying of unpatented products to pat332. 5 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 6-216.42.
333. See Fugate, supra note 309, at 450 (explaining the courts are trying to
strike a balance between antitrust enforcement and patent protection).
334. See generally Marks, Patent Licensing and Antitrust in the United
States and the European Economic Community, 35 AM. U.L. REV. 963 (1985).
335. See Regulation 2349/84, supra note 285, at art. 1(2).
336. Id,
337. See Marks, supra note 334, at 976.
338. See Regulation 2349/84, supra note 285, at art. 1.
339. Rosen, supra note 293, at 407.
340. Marks, supra note 334, at 981.
341. Id.
342. Regulation 2349/84, supra note 285, at art. 3. However, a minimum
purchase requirement, explicitly permitted under article 2 of the Regulation,
coupled with a best efforts clause is seemingly indistinguishable from a noncompetition clause. Marks, supra note 334, at 983. The Commission will undoubtedly have to evaluate the effects in such cases. Id.
343. Regulation 2349/84, supra note 285, at art. 3(6).
344. Id. at art. 3(5). See also Marks, supra note 334, at 985 (explaining that
the quantity limitations apply only to maximum quantities, not minimum
quantities).
345. Regulation 2349/84, supra note 285, at art. 3(1).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 24:145

ented products in licensing, 346 package licensing, 34 7 and other
clauses 348 are not within the Regulation's block exemption. Thus,
not only should businesses avoid the use of "black list" provisions in
their licensing agreements, they should attempt to stay within the
clauses on the "permitted list" and "white list" when drafting their
agreements to avoid the requirement of notifying the Commission.
The Court of Justice has also played a large role in EEC industrial property matters. In Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,349 the
Court removed internal barriers to trade associated with the existence of national patents. 3 5 The Court held that allowing a patentee the right granted to him by a Member State to prohibit the
marketing, in that Member State, of a product protected by the patent and put on the market in another Member State by the patentee or with his consent would be incompatible with the goal of free
movement of goods for the Common Market enounced in the EEC
Treaty. In other words, if it is less expensive to produce the product
in Member State X and transport it into Member State Y than it is
to just produce the product in Member State Y, the patentee cannot
prevent the importation of the patented goods from X to Y even if
patent protection exists in Y provided the products were produced
in X by the patentee or with his consent. The Commission was unable to attack this type of action under the antitrust laws because
the conduct involves only one party, and therefore article 85(1) is
inapplicable. Also, the ownership of a patent does not necessarily
confer a dominant position. 351 However, once again, the Court of
346. Marks, supra note 334, at 988.
347. Regulation 2349/84, supra note 285, at art. 3(9).

348. See generally Marks, supra note 334, at 990-92 (discussing how the exemption generally applies or does not apply to grantback requirements, royalties, and the duration of royalties).
349. 1974 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 1147 [1974 Transfer Binder], Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8246.
350. 5 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 6-216.53. It should be noted
that article 30 of the EEC Treaty only prohibits "restrictions of imports ...
between Member States." The Court of Justice has construed this phrase to be
inapplicable to countries outside of the EEC. See E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. CBS,
Case No. 51/75, June 15, 1976, 1976 E.C.R. 861, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8350, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 235 (1976); E.M.I Records, Ltd. v. C.B.S. Grammofon, Case No. 86/75, June 15, 1976, 1976 E.C.R. 871, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8351, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 235 (1976); E.M.I Records, Ltd. v. C.B.S.
Schallplatten GmbH., Case No. 96/75, June 15, 1976, 1976 E.C.R. 913, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8352, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 235 (1976) (freedom of movement rules do not address themselves to imports from abroad). However, there
are a few exceptions. The exceptions generally pertain to conventions and treaties negotiated between the EEC and third countries. Even if the language of
the convention or treaty is similar to that of article 30, the Court of Justice
tends not to construe these treaties in the same way as article 30. See 5 H. SMIT
& P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 6-216.30.
351. See Id at 6-216.26.
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Justice's decision reflected the importance of the free movement of
goods within the EEC.
Also, the Court of Justice has not approved restrictions on imports when goods are imported from a Member State where no patent protection existed into a Member State where protection
existed, 352 unless the imports were manufactured by an unrelated
third party.3 53 However, because a business selling its products in a
country where no patent protection can be obtained is not likely to
receive the price for them that would be available where patent
protection is possible, the patentee is deprived of some of the normal rewards of its patents. Thus, the Court of Justice subsequently
held that a German business with a patent on a pharmaceutical
product in the Netherlands could prevent a Dutch wholesaler from
importing, into the Netherlands, the same product, manufactured
in the United Kingdom under a compulsory license imposed by
British law. 354 The Court reached this decision for two basic reasons. First, the products were manufactured in the United Kingdom without the consent of the German business. Second, the
compulsory license the Dutch business was using prevented the
German business from setting the conditions under which its products could be manufactured in the United Kingdom and thus prevented it from reaping the rewards of its patent. Although similar
to the Centrafarm facts, Centrafarm is distinguishable in that the
parallel imports had been manufactured by a business that held a
negotiated license as opposed to having a compulsory license. Thus,
is seems the Court of Justice will give greater emphasis to economic
factors for patentees in future cases.
The United States achieved market integration two centuries
ago with the commerce clause of the Constitution. 35 5 The EEC has
market integration as their primary goal. Provided there is mutual
trust and understanding between the parties, 356 international
agreements can help the EEC accomplish their goal. The Commission has sought fit to specifically exclude from its Regulation on
licensing block exemptions certain license clauses that can and have
352. Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, Case No. 187/80, July 14, 1981, 1981 E.C.R.
2063 (patent owner in the Netherlands not entitled to prevent importation of
pharmaceutical product "Moduretic" marketed in Italy, where no patent protection existed for the product).
353. See Parke, Davis & Co. v. Prubel, Case No. 24/67, February 29, 1968, 14
Rec. 81, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8054, 7 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 47 (1968).
354. See Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, Case No. 19/84, July 9, 1985, 1985
E.C.R. 2281.
355.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

356. See Herold & Knoll, Negotiating and DraftingInternationalDistribution, Agency, and RepresentativeAgreements: The United States Exporter'sPerspective, 21 INT'L LAW. 939, 983 (1987).
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been defended from antitrust attack in the U.S.. 357 Thus, some
valid defenses to alleged violations of U.S. antitrust laws will fail as
defenses in the EEC if they do not promote market integration.
Therefore, businesses desiring to compete in the EEC must consider
all possible strategies when deciding the best methods for introducing their products into the EEC market while at the same time staying within the law.
4.

METHODS OF CONDUCTING BUSINESS WITHIN THE

EEC

4.1 Background
35
There are a few scenarios as to what may occur in the EEC. 8
First, the EEC may flop, which is unlikely. Second, the EEC may
achieve its goals by 1992, which would surprise many. Finally, the
EEC may achieve some of its goals by 1992 and continue to experience growing pains for several years thereafter until its ultimate
goals of total market integration and economic efficiency are
achieved.
The desire of the Member States to obtain the obvious advantages the EEC would afford them with respect to tariff wars and
economic efficiency will pull the nations together to form the EEC.
The question is: "When?" Due to the great task of harmonizing the
national laws to conform to the EEC Treaty, total integration will
probably not take place by 1992. However, the third scenario, one
of partial integration by 1992, seems to be imminent. Thus, the basic feeling is that U.S. businesses should have access to the Common
Market, but the question is what vehicle is best for businesses to use
in order to access the market.

4.2 Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services
The right of establishment 59 and the freedom to provide services
complement not only the free movement of workers 361 but
362
also the free movement of goods as the cornerstone to the EEC.
The right of establishment is the right of a natural person or a com36 °

357.
358.
ing the
359.

See generally Marks, supra note 334, at 974-92.
See generally supranotes 1-10 and accompanying text for ideas concernpossible paths the EEC might take.
Article 52 of the EEC Treaty provides for the right of establishment.

Articles 53 through 58 also deal with the right of establishment. See EEC
Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. 52, 53-58.
360. Article 59 of the EEC Treaty provides for the freedom to provide services. Articles 60 through 66 also deal with the freedom to provide services. Id. at
arts. 59, 60-66.
361. Articles 48 through 51 of the EEC Treaty govern the free movement of
workers. Id. at arts. 48-51.
362.

(1985).

GORMLEY, PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE EEC 223
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pany to settle in a Member State and to pursue economic activities
therein. 36s In contrast, the freedom to provide services permits a
person established in one Member State to provide services in another Member State. 364 Although drawing a distinction between
the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services has
drawn criticism, 36 5 minor legal differences in treatment exist and
therefore, the concepts are treated separately.
4.2.1

Right of Establishment

The right of establishment ensures not only the freedom to establish a business or practice in another Member State, but also the
freedom to pursue such activity under the same conditions as are
applied to nationals of the Member State concerned. 36 6 Article 52
grants the right of establishment to the "nationals of a Member
State." 36 7 , However, Article 58 is of more interest to international
businesses because it grants the right of establishment to companies368 which are "formed in accordance with the law of a Member
State and having their registered office, central administration or
principal place of business within the community."3 69 Thus, Article
58 mandates companies fulfill two requirements as a prerequisite to
370
enjoying the right of establishment.
363. D.

WYATT

& A.

DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE

EEC 182

(1980).

364. Id. Thus, for example, this is what enables a doctor established in

France to treat a client in Belgium.
365. See 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 2-517 to 2-518 (criticizing
the distinction and opining that the different treatment afforded to the right of
establishment may be due to the fact that it involves a change of residence and
may therefore impose a burden upon governmental services such as education
and public health and welfare); D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 363, at
182 (stating there is a lack of economic basis for the distinction and that there
may be difficulties in classification). Even the Court of Justice has noted that a
comparison of Articles 48 (free movement of workers), 52 (right of establishment), and 59 (freedom to provide services) shows "that they are based on the
same principles both in so far as they concern the entry into and residence in
the territory of Member States of persons covered by Community law and the
prohibition of all discrimination between them on grounds of nationality."
Procureur du Roi v. Royer, Case No. 48/75, [1976] E.C.R. 497, 2 COMMON MKT.

L.

REV.

619 (1976).

366. GORMLEY, supra note 362, at 227.
367. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 52.
368. The right of establishment of a company is not a prerequisite to the
company bringing suit within the EEC. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note
33, at 2-640.
369. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 58. This language is not intended as a
reference to resolve conflict of law issues. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note
33, at 2-643.
370. See generally 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 2-643 to 2-644.
Once the Article 58 requirements are fulfilled, a company should be treated the
same way as an individual for the purposes of establishment. Id. at 2-541.
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First, a company must be formed in accordance with the laws of
a Member State to enjoy the right of establishment. The drafters of
the EEC Treaty required this to ensure that companies benefiting
from the right of establishment have a direct link to the legal sys371
tem of a Member State.
Second, a company must have its registered office, 372 central
administration 373 or principal place of business 374 within the community. The second requirement ensures that the company has a
factual link to the community. 375 Although both requirements are
necessary to enjoy the right of establishment, they need not be sat376
isfied in one Member State.
In sum, companies based outside the EEC can, for example,
enter the EEC by incorporating a subsidiary377 in accordance with
the laws of a Member State and have the subsidiary's registered office in the same State or another Member State. 378 This would enable the subsidiary to conduct business throughout the EEC and
have secondary establishments3 79 in any Member State.380 These
seemingly liberal requirements place few limits on the establishment of companies controlled from outside the EEC. However, for
a variety of reasons, 38l companies planning to conduct business
within the EEC should not wait too long to establish themselves in
the EEC.
371. Id. at 2-643.
372. "The registered office of a company is located at the place designated as
such in the incorporation papers of the company." Id at 2-644.
373. "The central administration of a company is located where the company organs issue the decisions that are essential for the company's operation."

374. "The principal place of business is the place where the company has its
principal operational facilities." d.
375. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 2-644.

376. Id. Therefore, a company incorporating in France with its central administration in Greece fulfills the right of establishment requirements.
377. A subsidiary is a legally independent entity which is separate from its
parent company. Id at 2-540.

378. Id at 2-645.
379. Secondary establishments basically consist of branches or agencies. Id
A branch is distinguished from an agency in that the managers of a branch have

a certain degree of independence. Id at 2-540 to 2-541. Setting up secondary
establishments may have additional requirements. See generally id. at 2-645 to
2-646.
380. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at at 2-645.

381. Many steps could be taken which would deny access to foreign controlled companies. First, Article 56 could be invoked to exclude foreign-controlled companies on the grounds of public policy. I&at 2-645. Second, national
requirements concerning the formation of corporations may be unified. Id. The

unification may include a rule that only companies which are partially or exclusively controlled by nationals of Member States may be validly incorporated.

Id. Companies already conducting business within the EEC need not be concerned with these possibilities unless they are given retroactive effect.

1990]

European Economic Community

4.2.2 Freedom to Provide Services
Free movement of services between Member States may occur
in a variety of different manners. First, and most common, a person
from one Member State will temporarily travel to another Member
State to provide a service. 38 2 An example of this would be a lawyer
travelling to another Member State to represent a client. 383 Second, the person seeking the service may travel to another Member
State.3s 4 Third, a scenario where neither the provider of services
nor the person seeking services would move is possible. 3s5
The freedom to provide services may benefit persons as well as
companies. 386 Nationals and companies must be established to enjoy the benefits of the freedom to provide services3s 7 A company
whose registered office is situated inside the EEC, but whose central administration or principal place of business is not, satisfies this
requirement if their activities have "an effective and continuous
link with the economy of a Member State, excluding the possibility
that this link might depend on nationality, particularly the nationality of the partners or the members of the managing or supervisory
bodies, or of persons holding the capital stock." 3 s If this were not
required, companies having only a nominal factual basis in the EEC
would be unduly favored. 389
382. Id at 2-650.
383. The Commission and Council have both come to the opinion that freedom to provide services could be affected for lawyers. 2 H. SMir & P.E.
HERZOG, supra note 33, at January, 1984 supplement 68. The Commission and
Council opined this even though there are no uniform rules on legal education.
Id Accordingly, a Directive required all Member States, by March 22, 1979, to
permit lawyers from other Member States to provide services within the Member State. Council Directive of March 22, 1977, 1977 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 78)
17.

As a practical matter, a lawyer from one Member State will know less
about the law of the Member State he is travelling to. D. WYATT & A.
DASHWOOD, supra note 363, at 204. Thus, for court appearances, Member States
may require the lawyer from another Member State to act in conjunction with a
local lawyer. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at January, 1984 supplement 69. Therefore, it is possible this Directive will be used almost exclusively
in matters concerning EEC law. D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 363, at
204.
384. 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, supra note 33, at 2-650.
385. Id. An example of this would be where a laboratory in one Member
State was asked to provide an analysis and report on a sample mailed from another Member State. Id&
386. Id. at 2-657.
387. See D. WYATT & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 363, at 199; 2 H. SMIT & P.E.
HERZOG, supra note 33, at 2-657.
388. General Programme for the Abolition of Restrictions on the Freedom to
Provide Services, December 18, 1971, 1962 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 2) 32, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1546.
389. See 2 H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG,supra note 33, at 2-657.
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Direct Foreign Investment

U.S. companies should consider direct investment in the EEC
as one feasible alternative for entering the Common Market. U.S.
companies have already directly invested $127.8 billion in the
EEC. 3 9 ° However, direct investment has its problems.

A large problem for the U.S. investor is how to ensure maximum protection of an investment with the current state of insider
trading law in the EEC.39x In April, 1987, the Commission adopted
a proposal which aimed to establish uniform legislation coordinating insider trading regulations among the Member States.392 Currently, only the United Kingdom, France and Denmark have
enacted official insider trading statutes, 393 while other EEC nations
have proposed legislation 394 or have left insider trading unregulated. 395 Thus, the paucity of national insider trading statutes could
make implementation of the Commission's proposal difficult.
Additionally, ensuring maximum protection may be difficult
because enforcement of the Commission's proposed directive is a
major weakness. 396 The result is that businesses may only seek to
enter the Common Market via the direct foreign investment route
if uniform deterrence of insider trading can be established throughout the EEC.

397

If a business decides to use the direct foreign investment route,
the geographic area in which to invest within the EEC must be considered. U.S. real estate analysts consider Paris, Amsterdam and
Brussels to be top cities for investments. 398 The different considerations which made analysts choose Paris, 39 9 Amsterdam, 4° ° and
390. Sly, U.S. Firms Face 1992 on Shaky Ground, Chicago Tribune, April 10,
1988, § 4, at 1, cols. 4-5. England has had $50.2 billion invested in it, followed by
West Germany at $23.3 billion, the Netherlands at $14.8 billion, and France at
$12.3 billion. Id. All other countries in the EEC are below the 10 figure mark.
Id.
391. See Note, Toward the Unification of European Capital Markets: The
EEC's Proposed Directive on Insider Trading, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 432, 433
(1988).
392. Proposal for a Council Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider
Trading, COM(87) 111 final, at 3; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,880, at 12,126
(May 21, 1987).
393. Note, supra note 391, at 438. Germany has introduced a set of voluntary
rules prohibiting the exploitation of insider information. Id.
394. Belgium, the Netherlands, and Ireland have proposed legislation on insider trading. Id.
395. Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Luxembourg have left insider trading unregulated. Id.
396. Id. at 449.
397. Note, supra note 391, at 451-52.
398. Kerch, 1992 - US. Discovers Europe, Chicago Tribune, July 2, 1989,
§ 16, at 1, cols. 3-5.
399. Once a lease is signed in France, increases by law are limited to the
inflation rate. Id. at 2, col. 6.
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Brussels 401 as the top cities for investment will weigh differently
with each particular investor. Also, an investor may find none of
the three cities to be attractive and choose another alternative.
4.4 ,Mergers
A merger occurs when two or more entities which were formerly independent are brought under common control. 40 2 This
commonly occurs where company A acquires a controlling percentage of the shares in company B. 40 3 Certain types of mergers may
adversely affect competition 4° 4 and therefore, the EEC has sought
to regulate mergers.
There is no article in the EEC Treaty giving the Commission
specific power to control mergers. 40 5 However, the Commission has
used the antitrust laws of the EEC to prevent mergers. The Commission has decided that article 85 is inapplicable to mergers, 406 but
the validity of this decision is far from clear. 40 7 The Commission
has successfully used article 86 to nullify mergers where there
400. At about $20 per square foot, Amsterdam provides the lowest rents in
the EEC. Id. at col. 5.
401. The central location of Brussels will become increasingly important as
1992 comes closer. Id. at 1, cols. 3-5.

402. D.

WYATT

& A.

DASHWOOD,

supra note 363, at 316.

403. See Id.
404. Mergers amongst actual or potential competitors and between an entity
and its major supplier or consumer are most likely to adversely affect competition. D. WYATr & A. DASHWOOD, supra note 363, at 316.
405. KLUWER, MERGER CONTROL IN THE EEC 221 (1988); D. WYATT & A.
DASHWOOD, supra note 363, at 316.
406. See Banks, Mergers and PartialMergers Under EEC Law, 11 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 255, 258 (1988) (explaining that the Commission has concluded article
85 to be inapplicable to mergers).
407. See Philip Morris Inc./Rothmans InternationalPLC., Bull. EC 3-1984
point 2.1.43. On Appeal, British American Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Commission and R.J. Reynolds Industries Inc. v. Commission (Joined Cases 142/84 and
156/84), judgment dated 11/17/87, not yet reported (where the Court of Justice
stated the "main issue in these cases is whether and in what circumstances the
acquisition of a minority shareholding in a competing company may constitute
infringement of Article 85 and 86 of the Treaty"). Id. at 30 of the Judgment
(emphasis added). The Court later went on to state:
Since the acquisition of shares in Rothmans International was the subject
matter of agreements entered into by companies which have remained independent after the entry into force of the agreements, the issue must be
examined first of all from the point of view of Article 85.
Id. at 31 of the Judgment. Thus, the scope of similar cases that may fall within
Article 85 is limited in two important respects. First, the Court gives a reminder that the case at issue concerned the acquisition of only a minority shareholding in a competitor. KLUWER, supra note 405, at 271. Second, the Court
examined the case under Article 85 at least partially because the companies
agreed to remain independent after transfer of the shares. Id. See generally id.
at 263-79 (for a comprehensive discussion of Philips and its implications).
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would be an abuse of a dominant market position. 40 8 The Court of
Justice has upheld the Commission's theory that Article 86 applies
to mergers. 40 9 Since the antitrust laws of the EEC Treaty are used
to prevent or divest certain mergers, one must see how they apply
to each type of merger.
4.4.1

InternationalMergers

The Court of Justice stated that:
[E]very agreement must be assessed in its economic context and in
light of the situation on the relevant market. Moreover, where the
companies concerned are multinational corporations which carry on
business on a world-wide scale, their relationships outside the Community cannot be ignored. It is necessary in particular to consider the
possibility that the agreement in question may be part of a policy4 1of
0
global cooperation between the companies which are a party to it.
Thus, to comply with the policy set by the Court, the Commission is
likely to assert it has jurisdiction over mergers which take place
outside the EEC yet have a direct and substantial effect on competi411
tion within the EEC.
A company outside the EEC may be a party to an international
merger which falls within the EEC's antitrust laws. This may happen if: (1) a non-EEC enterprise acquires an EEC enterprise; (2) an
EEC enterprise acquires a non-EEC enterprise; or (3) two non-EEC
enterprises merge.
4.4.1.1

Non-EEC Enterprise Acquires EEC Enterprise

The acquisition of an EEC enterprise by a non-EEC enterprise
was the situation the Court of Justice confronted in Continental
Can.412 The U.S. based manufacturer of metal containers, Conti-

nental Can, was the majority shareholder of SLW, which was found
to have a dominant position in the supply of tins for meat and fish
408. See Continental Can Co., Inc., O.J. EUR. CoMM.(L 7/25) (1972), Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9481, 1972 COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 11.

409. See infra Section 4.4.1.1 text and accompanying notes (explaining that

the Court of Justice annulled the Commission's decision but agreed that Article
86 applied to certain mergers).

410. PhilipMorris Inc./Rothmans InternationalPLC., Bull. EC 3-1984 point

2.1.43. On Appeal, British American Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Commission and
R.J. Reynolds Industries Inc. v. Commission (Joined Cases 142/84 and 156/84),
judgment dated 11/17/87, not yet reported, 40.
411. See Commission's Eleventh Report on Competition Policy, 1981, point
34 (stating "[t]he EEC Treaty's rules on competition apply to restrictive or abusive practices by undertakings situated in non-member countries where their
conduct has an appreciable impact within the common market").
412. Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co., v. Commission, Case No.
6/72, [1973] E.C.R. 215. See Banks, supra note 406, at 266-74 for a detailed discussion of the history and implications of Continental Can, in addition to the
legislative reform it brought about.
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products and metal caps. Continental Can desired to acquire TDV,
which made all tins for meat and fish products and half the metal
caps in the Netherlands. Continental Can agreed with TDV to incorporate Europemballage in Delaware 413 and transfer to it Continental Can's interest in SLW. Once incorporated, Continental Can
would induce 414 Europemballage to make an offer to TDV shareholders. Europemballage purchased shares of TDV, increasing its
holdings from 10 percent to 91 percent of TDV's capital.
The Commission decided that Continental Can abused it dominant market position on the German market through its majority
owned subsidiary, SLW. Even though the Court of Justice annulled
the Commission's decision, 415 they upheld the Commission's view
that Article 86 applies to certain mergers. 416 During the proceedings before the Court of Justice, Continental Can averred that the
Commission had no jurisdiction over Continental Can because it did
not have a registered office in the EEC. Continental Can also asserted that the actions of its subsidiary could not be imputed to it
and that the entity which committed the alleged abuse,
Europemballage, was not the same as the entity which held the
dominant position, SLW. In rejecting all of these arguments, the
Court of Justice opined:
It is certain that Continental caused Europemballage to make a takeover bid to the shareholders of TDV in the Netherlands and made the
necessary means available for this.... Community law is applicable to
such an acquisition, which influences market conditions within the
Community. The circumstance that Continental does not have its registered office within the territory of one of the Member States 417
is not
sufficient to exclude it from the application of Community law.
The Court imputed the dominant position of SLW to Continental
Can. Thus, the Court set the tone for future mergers by stating that
when an entity external to the EEC, having a subsidiary within the
EEC with a dominant market position, acquires an EEC competitor
of it's EEC subsidiary, Article 86 applies as if a wholly intra-EEC
418
merger had occurred.
The Continental Can decision resolved some issues concerning
the acquisition of an EEC company by a non-EEC company. How413. Europemballage was to have offices in New York and Brussels.
414. Continental Can also provided funds for Europemballage to make an

offer.
415. The Court of Justice annulled the Commission's decision due to lack of
an adequate product market definition, Europemballage Corporation and Conti-

nental Can Co. v. Commission, Case No. 6/72, [1973] E.C.R. 215, 247-49.
416. The Court of Justice upheld the Commission's view that Article 86 applied to certain mergers. Id. at 245.
417. Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co. v. Commission,
Case No. 6/72, [1973] E.C.R. 215, 1973 COMMON MKT. L. REV. at 199,

418. See

KLUWER,

supra note 405, at 248.

16.
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ever, the decision did not address the situation in which the nonEEC acquiring company has no EEC branch or subsidiary. It is conceivable that such a company could have a dominant position in the
EEC as a result of its exports to the EEC. However, in this scenario, there is no EEC subsidiary through which an abuse of a dominant market position could be imputed to the parent company.
Realizing this potential loophole for harmful mergers, the Commission drafted a regulation, which has not yet been adopted by the
Council, stating, in pertinent part:
Any transaction which has the direct or indirect effect of bringing
about a concentration between undertakings or groups of undertakings, at least one of which is established in the common market,
whereby they acquire or enhance the power to hinder effective competition in the common market or in a substantial part thereof, is incompatible with the common market in 419
so far as the concentration may
affect trade between Member States.
Thus, it is likely that this loophole for non-EEC companies without
EEC subsidiaries will be closed.
4.4.1.2

EEC Enterprise Acquires Non-EEC Enterprise

There are three basic scenarios in which an EEC enterprise
could acquire a non-EEC enterprise. 420 First, the non-EEC enterprise could have a competing subsidiary in the EEC. Second, the
non-EEC enterprise may not have a subsidiary in the EEC but it
may have substantial exports to the EEC. Third, the non-EEC enterprise may lack both a subsidiary in and exports to the EEC but
may be a potential entrant to the EEC market.
In the first two scenarios, the Commission would have jurisdiction via the Continental Can decision. The Commission may then
assert the dominant enterprise 42 1 was attempting to abuse its position in violation of Article 86. Finally, in the third scenario, the
Commission could apply Article 86 because the Continental Can
case covers mergers by dominant enterprises even if it only affects
422
potential competition.
419. Article 1(1) (emphasis added). The merger control regulation was first
proposed in 1973, (O.J. EuR. COMM. (C 92/1) (10/31/73)) and, subsequently,
amended proposals were put forward in 1982, 1984, and 1986 (O.J. EUR. COMM.
(C 36/3) (2/12/82), O.J. EuR. COMM. (C 51) (2/23/84), and O.J. EUR. COMM. (C
324/5) (12/17/86) respectively). See generally KLUWER, supra note 405, at 280-93
(discussing the Commission's proposed merger control regulation and what the
Commission may do if its proposal is not adopted).
420. Id. at 249.
421. The dominant enterprise could be either the EEC or non-EEC
enterprise.
422. See KLUWER, supra note 405, at 249 (for an interpretation of Continental Can).
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Merger of Two Non-EEC Enterprises

There are two basic situations in which mergers between two
non-EEC enterprises could fall within the ambit of the EEC's antitrust laws. 423 First, each merging enterprise could have a subsidiary in the EEC, at least one of which has a dominant position.
Second, neither enterprise may have a subsidiary in the EEC but
they both may have substantial exports to the EEC.
The first scenario would permit the Commission to treat the
424
merger as one taking place between the subsidiaries in the EEC.
If the second scenario occurred, the Commission could claim jurisdiction over the merger but it is unlikely the Court of Justice would
uphold such a decision. 425 Additionally, the Commission would also
426
face the potentially serious problem of how to enforce its order.
4.4.2 Inadequaciesof the EEC's Control of InternationalMergers
One might think that Article 86 is an effective way to police
mergers. However, since Continental Can, the Commission has not
condemned a single merger.427 Additionally, Continental Can's
agreement with TDV resulted in such an obvious dominant market
position that the Commission could not ignore it. Since Continental
Can, the Commission has stated that as little as 40 percent is
enough to establish a dominant market position, 428 yet Article 86 is
429
still unable to effectively control harmful mergers.
It is generally agreed that Article 86 is a horrendous merger
control tool. 430 First, it can only be used where one enterprise al423. See id.
424. This is what the Commission did in PhilipMorris Inc./Rothmans International PLC. Bull EC 3-1984 point 2.1.43. On Appeal, British American Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Commission and R.J. Reynolds Industries Inc. v.
Commission (Joined Cases 142/84 and 156/84), judgment dated 11/17/87, not yet
reported. This was an arrangement between a U.S. company and a South African company both having subsidiaries in the EEC. The Commission found the
fact the parties had their corporate headquarters outside the EEC immaterial.
425. KLUWER, supra note 405, at 250.
426. Id.
427. Banks, supra note 406, at 273.
428. Commission's Tenth Report on Competition Policy, 150 (1981) (stating
"[a] dominant position can generally be said to exist once a market share to the
order of 40% to 45% is reached"). Additionally, in its current proposed merger
control regulation, the Commission stated that if a merger accounts for less
than 20 percent of the market, there is a rebuttable presumption that the
merger is compatible with the Common Market. See Article 1, Commission's
proposed merger control regulation, first proposed in 1973, (O.J. EUR. COMM. (C
92/1) (10/31/73), and subsequently amended in 1982, 1984, and 1986 (O.J. EUR.
COMM. (C 36/3) (2/12/82), O.J. EUR. COMM. (C 51) (2/23/84), and O.J. EUR.
CoMM. (C 324/5) (12/17/86), respectively).
429. See Banks, supra note 406, at 273-74; KLUWER, supra note 405, at 251.
430. See id. at 289 (stating "Article 86 has proved to be hopelessly inadequate
as an instrument of merger control"); Banks, supra note 406, at 273 (stating "it
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ready possesses a dominant market position.4 31 Second, it only
polices those mergers that are so extreme they eliminate competition. 43 2 Third, it does not confer the power to block a merger before
it occurs,43 3 although the Commission could block a merger through
the use of interim measures, preserving the status quo pending a

final decision. 434 Fourth, it does not mandate prior notification of
proposed mergers. 435 Finally, it does not provide for exemptions
for reasons not connected to competition, 436 although the Commission's proposal does. 437 Therefore, the end result of all of this is
that advising clients on how to conduct mergers is a formidable
4
task. 38
cannot be disputed that as an instrument for merger control, the Article 86
weapon leaves much to be desired").
431. Id.
432. See id,at 274 (emphasis added).
433. Id However, the problem of only being able to attack mergers after
they occur rather than in the negotiation or planning stage is lessened to the
extent that Article 85 applies to mergers (referring to the Philips Morris/Rothmans case). KLUWER, supra note 405, at 251.
434. The Court of Justice announced that:
The Commission must also be able, within the bounds of its supervisory
task conferred upon it in competition matters by the Treaty and Regulation
No. 17, to take protective measures to the extent to which they might appear indispensable in order to avoid the exercise of the power to make decisions given by Article 3 from becoming ineffectual or even illusory because
of the action of certain undertakings. The powers which the Commission
holds under Article 3(1) of Regulation No. 17 therefore include the power
to take interim measures which are indispensable for the effective exercise
of its functions and, in particular, for ensuring the effectiveness of any decisions requiring undertakings to bring to an end infringements which it has
found to exist.
Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission, Case No. 792/79 R, [1980] ECR 119, 18, 1
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 334, $ 18. Thus, the Commission has the power to order
interim measures in merger cases which appear likely to result in an infringement of Article 86. KLUWER, supra note 405, at 251. The Commission will grant
interim measures if:
(a) there is a reasonably strong prima facie case that there has been a violation of the competition rules of the Treaty;
(b) interim measures are urgently needed; and
(c) the interim measures are needed to avoid a situation which is likely to
cause serious and irreparable damage to the party seeking adoption of the measures, or the failure to adopt the measures would be intolerable to the public
interest. Id. at 252.
435. Banks, supra note 406, at 274. Currently, only Italy is opposed to compulsory notification of mergers which would result in a concentration of the
market above a certain threshold. KLUWER, supra note 405, at 282.
436. Id.
437. Mergers which are "indispensable to the attainment of an objective
which is given priority treatment in the common interest of the Community"
are exempt from the Commission's proposed merger control regulation. Article
1(3) of the merger control regulation, first proposed in 1973, (O.J. EUR. COMM.

(C 92/1) (10/31/73)) and, subsequently, amended proposals were put forward in
1982, 1984, and 1986 (O.J. EUR.COMM. (C 36/3) (2/12/82), O.J. EUR. COMM. (C

51) (2/23/84), and O.J. EUR. COMM. (C 324/5) (12/17/86) respectively)).
438. Banks, supra note 406, at 309.
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4.5

Joint Ventures

A joint venture is, in essence, a partial merger. 43 9 International
joint ventures serve to spread the risks of trading or investing
abroad, facilitate technology transfers, help overcome national restrictions on and prejudices against foreign investment, and allow
for international economic integration and efficiency. 440 Joint ventures may bring desirable economic results and thus, there is no
duty to notify the Commission regarding any joint venture in which
one partakes. 441 Although optional, notifying the Commission gives
the participants to a joint venture certain advantages. 442 However,
if possible, it is advantageous to structure your joint ventures to fall
within the block exemption granted to research and development
joint ventures. 443
4.5.1

Research and Development Joint Ventures

Research and development joint ventures can enhance the
technological competitiveness of the EEC. Previously, businesses
were apprehensive to engage in R & D joint ventures. This is because national courts cannot grant an exemption under article
85(3). 4" Thus, a joint venture successfully challenged in a national
court under article 85(1) is void under article 85(2) and its ultimate
validity cannot be determined until the Commission can rule on the
possibility of an individual exemption under article 85(3).
4.5.1.1

Commission's Regulation of R & D Joint Ventures

In order to promote this technological competitiveness, on December 19, 1984, the Commission adopted its Regulation on R & D
cooperation agreements. 445 The Regulation basically provides that
R & D joint ventures fall within the ambit of article 85(3). The
439. See id. at 255.
440. Davidow, Special Antitrust Issues Raised by InternationalJoint Ventures, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1031, 1037 (1985).
441. See Hawk, Counseling Partnersin a U.S. - Foreign Joint Venture and
U.S. Antitrust Jurisdiction in International Trade, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 1083
(1985).
442. The advantages of notification are: (1) the preclusion of fines from the
period following notification; (2) legal certainty; and (3) the manifestation of a
cooperative spirit. Id. See generally id. at 1083-87 (for a discussion of each of
these advantages and an explanation of the circumstances in which notifying
the Commission of a joint venture is wise).
443. Id. at 1085.
444. Regulation 17/62 (EEC) of the Council, J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L. 13) 204
(1962) art. 9(1) ("Commission shall have sole power to declare Article 85(1) inapplicable pursuant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty").
445. Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 418/85 of Dec. 19, 1984 on the application of article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to categories of R & D agreements, O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 53) 5 (1985) [hereinafter R & D block exemption].
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immunity from article 85(1) granted by the R & D block exemption
44
is effective from March 1, 1985 to December 31, 1997. 6
4.5.1.1.1

Scope of the Regulation

The scope of the R & D block exemption is limited. First, the
exemption only applies to integrated R & D joint ventures,447 applied research joint ventures, 4" and basic research joint ventures.449 As defined, research and development excludes
manufacturing. 4 5° Second, once found to be within one of the above
three catagories, the R & D joint venture must also meet certain
threshold tests to be eligible for the block exemption. The exemption is conditioned upon: the existence of a detailed program for the
452
joint venture;451 the parties having equal access to the results;
the free exploitation of the results, if relating to basic research; 453
the limitation-of joint exploitation to results that are "decisive" for
application to manufacturing; 454 the limitation that outside contractors who manufacture the joint venture's products supply them
446. Id, at arik 13.
447. An integrated R & D joint venture includes the dimension of developing
research results into new products, goods, or processes. Recent Development,
Emerging InternationalAntitrust Perspectives on Research and Development
Joint Ventures, 16 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 1181, 1182 (1984) [hereinafter Recent Development]. Article 1(1) of the R & D block exemption grants exemptions to those joint ventures that undertake "joint research and development of
products or processes and joint exploitation of the results of that research and
development." f & D block exemption, supra note 445, at art 1, sec. (1)(d). Exploitation of the results is defined to include manufacturing products or
processes that result from R & D, or the licensing of the intellectual property
rights of such products or processes. See R & D block exemption, supra note
445, at art. 2(d); Recent Development supra, at 1205 n.156.
448. An applied research joint venture focuses on research results with specific commercial applications. Recent Development, supra note 447, at 1182.
Article 1(1) of the R & D block exemption grants exemptions to those joint
ventures that undertake "joint exploitation of the results of research and development of products and processes jointly carried out pursuant to a prior agreement between the same undertakings." R & D block exemption, supra note 445,
at § (1)(b).
449. A basic research joint venture seeks to gain knowledge from knowledge. Recent Nvelopment, supra note 447, at 1182. Article 1(1) of the R & D
block exemption grants exemptions to those joint ventures that undertake
"joint research and development of products or processes excluding joint exploitation of the results, in so far as such agreements fall within the scope of
Article 85(1)." Id. at 1205. "Exploitation of the results is defined to include
manufacturing products or processes that result from R & D, or licensing of
intellectual property rights relative to such products or processes." Id. at 1205
n.156. See also R & D block exemption, supra note 445, at art. 1(d).
450. R & D block exemption, supra note 445, at art. 2(a).
451. Id, at art. 2(a).
452. Id, at art. 2(b).
453. Id. at art, 2(c).
454. Id. at art. 2(d).
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only to joint venture participants; 455 and the requirement that nonjoint venture manufacturers have requirements contracts with the
joint venture participants. 456 Once the agreement has met these
threshold requirements, the portions of the agreement that would
otherwise restrict competition are exempt provided they are enumerated in the R & D block exemption. 45 7 However, research and
development joint ventures containing obligatory clauses that are
not enumerated in the R & D block exemption can still receive exempt status provided proper written notification is sent to the Commission and the Commission does not oppose the exemption within
45
six months. 8
4.5.1.1.2

Duration of the Regulation

The duration of the R & D block exemption depends on the
type of joint venture involved. If the joint venture participants are
not competing manufacturers of products capable of being improved or replaced by products that result from the research and
development, a block exemption as to basic and applied research
lasts for the duration of the joint venture agreement. 459 However,
if the joint venture exploits the results of the research and development, then the manufacturing of the products are exempt from article 85(1) for a period of five years from the time the products are
first marketed in the EEC.46° If the parties to a joint venture are
competitors and the participants' market share is less than 20 per455. R & D block exemption, supra note 445, at art. 2(e).
456. Id. at art. 2(f).
457. Id. at art. 4. Clauses which provide that: the parties will not undertake
independent research; the parties will not contract with third parties to undertake independent research; exclusive dealing arrangements for manufacture
exist; territorial restrictions on manufacturing exist; manufacture of products is
restricted to specific technical fields within the scope of the joint venture; territorial marketing restrictions for a period of up to five years exist; and crosslicensing agreements between the parties exist are exempt from the ambit of
article 85(1). Id.
458. See id. at art. 7(1), 7(3). If a Member State opposes the exemption of an
agreement's clause that is not specifically enumerated, the Commission must
oppose the exemption. Id, at art. 7(5). The Commission may withdraw its opposition at any time. Id at art. 7(6). However, if the Commission's opposition was
forced by a Member State requesting the opposition, the Commission must consult the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions
before withdrawing opposition. Id If the Commission withdraws an opposition,
the exemption applies: from the date of notification, if the opposition is withdrawn because the participants have shown the Commission that the joint venture meets the conditions of article 85(3); or from the date of amendment, if the
opposition is withdrawn because the participants have amended the agreement
so that the conditions of article 85(3) are met. See id. at arts. 7(7), 7(8).
459. Id. at art. 3(1).
460. R & D block exemption, supra note 445, at art. 3(1).
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cent at the time the agreement was signed,46 1 the R & D block exemption's duration is the length of the agreement.
4.5.1.1.3

Miscellaneous Provisions

The R & D block exemption contains miscellaneous provisions
which may prove important. First, an escape clause provides that
the Commission may withdraw the exemption's protective shield
where the agreement is incompatible with the spirit of article
85(3).462 Second, provided the Commission does not object, any R &
D joint venture which previously received a negative clearance can
receive an exemption by merely communicating such a desire to the
Commission. 46 3 Finally, trade secrets obtained by the Commission
in connection with a decision whether to oppose an exemption will
not be disclosed.4 "
4.5.1.1.4

Implications of the R & D Regulation

United States entities desiring to implement R & D joint ventures with EEC entities have the choice of incorporating within the
U.S. or the EEC. Under U.S. legislative reform,465 Congress sought
to reduce the business community's uncertainty concerning the application of antitrust laws to R & D joint ventures.466 To ensure
certainty, the legislation explicitly provides that potential antitrust
challenges to R & D joint ventures will be adjudicated under the
rule of reason. 467 Although this seems to provide multinational R
461. See Recent Development, supra note 447, at 1207 n.170, 1216 n.227 and
accompanying text (explaining that the 20 percent limit might actually be a
condition precedent to an exemption).
462. R & D block exemption, supra note 445, at art. 10. Activities which are
particularly suspect to withdrawal of an exemption are: substantial restrictions
on R & D activities within a field; restrictions on the access of third parties to
the market for joint venture products; failure of the joint venture to develop
products, without an "objectively valid" reason; and the production by the joint
venture that have no substitutes in the Common Market. Id,
463. Id. at art. 7(4).
464. Id. at art. 12.
465. On October 11, 1984, President Reagan signed into law the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq.). The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984
"provides explicit congressional recognition of the fact that joint R & D activity
will generally encourage competition, and that such competition should not be
inhibited by unclear antitrust standards." S. Rep. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1984).
466. Id. at 4.
467. Section 3 of the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, supra note
465, provides:
In any action under the antitrust laws, or under any State law similar to the
antitrust laws, the conduct of any person in making or performing a contract to carry out a joint research and development venture shall not be
deemed illegal per se; such conduct shall be judged on the basis of its reasonableness, taking into account all relevant factors affecting competition,
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& D joint ventures with no new incentive to incorporate in the
U.S., 46 the legislation has its benefits. A multinational joint venture is shielded from treble damage awards in private antitrust
challenges provided it discloses itself to the Department of Justice
469
and the Federal Trade Commission.
On the other hand, incorporating in the EEC has virtues also.
Under EEC law, those agreements meeting the EEC's R & D block
exemption safe harbor standards are exempt from challenges under
article 85(1).470 Thus, the agreements are automatically exempt
from the Commission's scrutiny and are not even subject to a rule
of reason type analysis. Additionally, this change removes the burden of having to seek an individual exemption from the Commission. A further advantage is that the multinational R & D joint
venture is no longer in a state of limbo if challenged in a national
court while awaiting an individual exemption decision from the
Commission.
Multinational R & D joint venture agreements which cannot
meet the safe harbor standards are afforded no advantage by the R
& D block exemption. 4 71 Joint ventures with competitors as participants that do not meet the 20 percent market test remain suspect to article 85(1) challenges and must prove that they meet
article 85(3)'s exemption criteria if challenged. Thus, the multinational R & D joint venture incorporating in the EEC and desiring
the block exemption must undergo Commission scrutiny, making
EEC incorporation viable only for those agreements meeting the R
& D block exemption's safe harbor standards. 472 This is a deterrent
473
to incorporating in the EEC.

In sum, the legislation of both Congress and the Commission
reflect compromises. Although Congress has disclosure requirements, they did offer protection from treble damages in private antitrust challenges. The Commission compromised in a different
way by conditioning the availability of a block exemption upon the
including, but not limited to, effects on competition in properly defined,
relevant research and development markets.
Id.
468. See Recent Development, supra note 447, at 1220-21 (explaining the application of the rule of reason to antitrust challenges to R & D joint ventures
does not represent a significant change from the past).
469. Id. at 1221.
470. The agreements could still be challenged as violative of article 86, which
prohibits the abuse of a dominant market position.
471. Recent Development, supra note 447, at 1221.
472. Id. at 1222. The R & D join ventures this would typically include are
those amongst non-competitors (firms expanding into new fields) and those
amongst competitors whose total market share in the Common Market does not
exceed 20 percent. Id.
473. Id.
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competitive status of the agreement's participants. Thus, the parties to each particular agreement must weigh the pros and cons of
incorporating in both locations.
4.6

Overall Business Implications

Companies should get a foothold in the EEC as soon as possible
and hope that any unification of national requirements concerning
the formation of corporations is not retroactive. 474 Product oriented companies should ensure they are "established" and service
oriented companies should ensure they meet the requirements to
be able to provide their services throughout the EEC.
Direct foreign investment is a viable method for penetrating
the EEC market for those companies not concerned with the potential effects of insider trading. However, there are other considera475
tions that must be weighed.
Mergers are another viable method for penetrating the EEC's
market. Companies partaking in mergers should be wary of their
vulnerability to the EEC's antitrust laws, which apparently have
worldwide reach. This includes article 86, which prohibits the
abuse of a dominant market position, and to a certain extent article
85.476 Also, mergers require no notification, but that may soon
change if the Commission's proposal is adopted. 477 Potential parties
to a merger should identify which of the three categories of international mergers478 they fit into and work from there.
Joint ventures should be strongly considered, particularly in
479
the R & D field due to the Commission's Regulation in this area
and recent U.S. legislation. 480 Decisions with respect to R & D joint
ventures will center around where to incorporate. In general, those
R & D joint ventures that can satisfy the safe harbor standards of
the EEC's R & D block exemption are wise to incorporate in the
EEC. Those that cannot meet the safe harbor standards should in474. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for an explanation of how current and potential legislation could deny EEC access to foreign controlled
companies.
475. See generally supra section 4.3 for a discussion of direct foreign
investment.
476. See supra note 407 regarding the PhilipMorris/Rothmans case and the
applicability of article 85 to mergers.
477. See generally supra section 4.4.2 for a discussion of the inadequacies of
the EEC's merger controls.
478. See supra sections 4.4.1.1, 4.4.1.2, and 4.4.1.3 for a discussion of each type
of international merger a non-EEC business may get involved with.
479. See generally supra section 4.5.1.1 for a discussion of the Commission's
regulation of R & D enterprises.
480. See generally supra section 4.5.1.1.4 for a discussion of the implications
of R & D regulations.

19901

European Economic Community

corporate in the U.S. and take advantage of the legislative shield
from treble damages.
5.

CONCLUSION

The EEC will become a reality on December 31, 1992, or shortly
thereafter. Many corporations have already entered the common
market. These companies should vigorously protect their intellectual property rights and other rights within the EEC. Those corporations which have not entered the common market should
consider doing so. Failure to enter the market soon may diminish
corporate opportunities within the market. Corporations seeking to
enter the market should not only consider different methods of entry, but also how to protect products and services once they are being distributed throughout the EEC.
The EEC may be a nightmare for those corporations ill prepared to conduct or protect business according to EEC law. However, the EEC represents a great market for those who do know
how to conduct and protect their business according to EEC law. A
knowledge of EEC law should not only help to keep one abreast of
competitors, it should help one to surpass competitors. Plan now
for the future.
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APPENDIX A

THE PROCESS OF COMMUNITY LEGISLATION

Within three months
either approves
Common Position
or takes no position

COMMISSION
Revises proposal or
rejects amendments

